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ABSTRACT
This thesis applies Dynamic Strategic Planning (DSP) to transportation
infrastructure investment in Japan. It focuses on the difference in project evaluations
between the conventional and DSP-based cost-benefit analysis. It also analyzes policy
issues in implementing DSP in Japan's Ministry of Transportation (MOT).
Today, the Japanese government faces criticism of its inefficient public works
investments at both macro and project levels. To cope with this, MOT announced that it
would incorporate cost-benefit analysis into its decision-making for investments in major
new projects. While this movement in MOT is supposed to make its investments more
efficient, conventional cost-benefit analysis does not systematically take into account
future uncertainties and risks and can lead to wrong decisions.
DSP is the approach that takes into account future uncertainties and risks and
insures managerial flexibility. It can maximize the expected net present value (NPV) of a
project. In other words, it can minimize the loss of NPV caused by a failure to choose the
best strategy.
A case study of a container terminal development in Japan introduces the problem
of the conventional method and advantages of DSP. It demonstrates that project
valuation based on DSP using decision tree analysis, the Black-Scholes equation, or
Monte-Carlo simulation, is more precise than the conventional method. Also, DSP has
advantages over the conventional method in terms of its ability to increase the real value
of projects.
This thesis finally analyzes policy issues in implementing DSP in MOT, and
recommends that MOT use DSP as a basis of its decision-making while the Ministry
considers political issues.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard de Neufville
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Chairman, MIT Technology and Policy Program
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INTRODUCTION
Investment by the Japanese government is required to be more efficient today
than it used to be. For the past half-century, the Japanese government has almost
continually invested in the nation's transportation infrastructure under the assumption
that demand for it will increase rapidly. This government strategy has supported the
healthy growth of the country. This situation, however, has changed. The economic
growth of Japan in 1999 is not as strong as it used to be. The public sector is suffering
from a huge budget deficit. Under such circumstances, some public works are being
criticized as inefficient [Takemura 1996, Sumita 1998]. Accordingly, it is now very
important to increase the efficiency of public investments.
Literature regarding project investment policy is abundant. Public Economics, for
example, is an established field of study in which efficient government investment policy
is discussed [Stiglitz 1988]. Cost-benefit analysis is one of the most popular approaches
to making a decision on a project [Anderson and Settle 1977, Zerbe and Dively 1994]. In
some advanced Western countries, such as Germany and the United States, cost-benefit
analysis has sometimes been applied to decision processes [Morisugi and Kayahara
1998]. Furthermore, the study of corporate finance has developed the theory of optimal
investment policy. Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) is one of the most important
approaches to an investment decision in many private companies [Brealey and Myers
1996]. Recently, the value of "Real Options," i.e., the option value with investment
opportunities in real assets, which is analogous to financial options, has been
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incorporated into DCF [Trigeorgis 1996, Amram and Kulitilaka 1999]. One of the most
crucial issues in these approaches to making the optimal investment plans is how to deal
with future uncertainties and risks. Dynamic Strategic Planning (DSP) is the approach
that takes into account future uncertainties and risks and insures managerial flexibility. It
maximizes the expected net present value (NPV) of a project. In other words, it
minimizes the loss of NPV caused by a failure to choose the best strategy.
The Japanese government, however, has not systematically incorporated these
project evaluation approaches into its decision-making process in public transportation
infrastructure development. In Japan, the public sector (either the national government or
local governments) usually assumes the authority to develop and operate major
transportation infrastructures, such as roads, seaports, and airports, and there is no statute
that requires the public sector to carry out an analysis of project efficiency, such as cost-
benefit analysis. As a result, although private companies seriously examine project
efficiency as a matter of course, this has not been the case with government projects. In
addition, Japanese government investment has been usually based on a single best
forecast, and, consequently, has been vulnerable with respect to future uncertainties.
Japan's Ministry of Transportation (MOT) has started to undertake cost-benefit analysis
when investing in major transportation projects. It has also instituted re-evaluation
systems for ongoing projects. With this setup, MOT now hopes to ensure the efficiency
of its investments. Although this arrangement seems to be the correct way to carry out
efficient investment, MOT might fail in choosing the best strategy since it does not
systematically take into account future uncertainties and risks.
18
This thesis analyzes both the current MOT system and DSP in investing in the
transportation infrastructure in Japan. There are two major questions to be examined:
e Does DSP work better than the current system in terms of the efficiency of the
transportation infrastructure investment in Japan?
e Should the Japanese government incorporate DSP into the transportation
infrastructure investment?
This thesis contains five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 introduces
criticisms of the government's inefficient investments in Japan and efforts to make them
more efficient. Chapter 2 examines the uncertainties and risks in transportation
infrastructure investment, mainly using examples of Japanese transportation projects.
Chapter 3 explains the concept and advantages of DSP and its project valuation methods,
such as Decision Analysis, and Real Options. Chapter 4 is dedicated to a case study in
which a container terminal development in Japan is evaluated by the DSP approach based
on the cost-benefit analysis framework. After the analyses of the case study, Chapter 5
discusses issues in implementing DSP in Japan. The conclusion summarizes the findings
of this thesis.
19
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CHAPTER 1
CRITICISMS OF TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
SYSTEMS IN JAPAN AND EFFORTS TO MAKE THEM MORE EFFICIENT
The national government, mainly through either the Ministry of Transportation
(MOT) or the Ministry of Construction (MOC), strongly controls transportation
infrastructure developments in Japan. Accordingly, the methods used by MOT or MOC
to implement policy aimed at making its investments more efficient are crucial for the
overall efficiency of transportation infrastructure investments in Japan. This chapter first
introduces criticisms of inefficient infrastructure investments in Japan, and then
overviews Japanese transportation infrastructure development systems that might affect
investment efficiency. Finally, this chapter examines efforts towards more efficient
investments.
Criticism of Inefficient Investments
Today, the Japanese government faces criticism of its inefficient public works
investments at both macro and project levels. When the national economy was growing
rapidly, it was relatively easy to justify an investment because demand for the
infrastructure was expected to be sufficient soon, if not immediately. The growth of
Japan's economy, however, has stagnated recently, and the national budget has been
suffering from a huge deficit. Under such circumstances, inefficient investments in
public infrastructure have been severely criticized.
21
Criticism at Macro Level
During the past decade, the portions of the national budget allocated to each
public works sector in Japan have remained almost the same (Figure 1-1). On the basis
of this rigid budget allocation alone, some opinion leaders doubt that the overall
efficiency of the government's investments is very high [Takemura 1996]. Such doubts
have not remained purely a domestic matter. The U. S. journal Business Week, for
example, has stated that years of wasteful public works spending have driven up Japan's
gross debt level to 110 percent of the gross national product [Bremner 1999].
Criticism at Project Level
Some individual projects funded by the national government have been criticized
as being oversized. Among these, the criticism of the Fukui Seaport Project is
particularly hard on MOT. Sumita reports that the local people are calling this "a fishing
pond costing ten billion Yen" because the level of berth usage is only around ten percent
of the projection [Sumita 1998].
Transportation Infrastructure Development Systems in Japan
While the private sector is very sensitive to the cost-revenue soundness of its
investments, the public sector is conscious about the equity of distribution as well as
maximizing social benefits. In addition to this inherent nature of the government
investment that might reduce the investment efficiency in terms of cost-benefit, the
22
Figure 1-1: Portions of the national public works budget allocated to major
transportation infrastructure in Japan
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Source: Takemura (1996)
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established transportation infrastructure development systems in Japan might be "double-
edged." That is to say, while the robust Japanese systems, such as the national
government permission for master plans and the determination of investment five-year
plans, are useful for stable realization of projects, they might create undesirable
inflexibility in terms of investment efficiency.
Permission for Developments or Plans
Major transportation infrastructure developments usually must be authorized by
the national government in the national economic plan, the national development master
plan, and regional development master plans. Furthermore, in the case of airport
developments, for example, a developer must adhere to the procedures shown in Figure
1-2 in carrying out its development plan. In the case of seaport developments, a
developer must follow the procedures shown in Figure 1-3 in determining a seaport
master plan. Usually, these procedures are rather time-consuming and burdensome,
which might not only cause failure to develop facilities in a timely manner, but might
also create a tendency to stick to the authorized plan regardless of changes in
circumstances.
Investment Five-year Plans
The national government determines long-term development plans for most
transportation facilities (Table 1-1). For example, MOT creates the Seaport Investment
Five-year Plan, determining and adding up investments for seaport master plans
24
Figure 1-2: Procedures before developing an airport in Japan
1. Submission of application to develop an airport to the Minister
of Transportation
2. Notification of the public about the application by the Minister
3. Public hearing held by the Minister
4. Examination of the application by the Minister
5. Approval of the development by the Minister
6. Notification of the public about development by the Minister
Source: Hirai (1984)
Figure 1-3: Procedures before authorizing a seaport master plan
in Japan
1. Consultation on a plan by a Local Advisory Committee
2. Submission of the plan to the Minister of Transportation
3. Consultation on the plan by the Minister's Advisory Committee/
Examination of the plan by the Minister
4. Approval of the plan by the Minister
5. Notification of the public about the plan by the developer
Source: Fujino and Kawasaki (1981)
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for the projected five year period. Sometimes making a five-year plan is a statutory
mandate as is the case with the Seaport Investment Five-year Plan (required by the
Seaport Development Urgent Measure Law), and sometimes it is not. Although most of
the current five-year investment plans are not completely inflexible, it is difficult to
initiate projects that are not incorporated into the plan during the five year period. This is
particularly true in cases of seaports and airports because five-year plans related to these
facilities designate individual seaports and airports to be funded during the five year
period. This might also create a tendency to stick to the plan, making it difficult to
expand and/or abandon planned projects.
Subsidies by the National Government
Whether the national government is the developer or not, it usually gives a
significant amount of subsidies and/or loans to developers. This gives the national
government strong control over developers. Furthermore, once developers get the
subsidy, Article 18 of the Law Regarding Appropriate Enforcement of Subsidies, enacted
in 1955, basically requires them to return all of this money if they abandon the project
[Tokyo Horei 1997]. This might be one of the major reasons why it is very difficult for
local governments to abandon projects even when the investment appears to be unwise.
Consequently, local governments may have to stick to their original plans.
26
Efforts Towards More Efficient Investments
For roughly the past half-century, the investment in the transportation
infrastructure in Japan has been intended to accommodate rapidly increasing demand in
this sector. During the periods when the national economy was growing along with
demand for all types of transportation, the cost-benefit efficiency of projects was not
systematically analyzed in initiating the investment, although the economic multiplier
effect of the project had sometimes been studied. The investment decision was supposed
to be made so as to accommodate future demand based on a deterministic scenario
created by the government [Sumita 1998]. Today, criticisms, such as those mentioned
above, have driven the national government to increase the efficiency of its investments.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Because the press, politicians, opinion leaders, and others are criticizing the
inefficiencies of public investments, each ministry in the national government has
launched its own efforts to cope with this issue. In March 1997 MOT announced that it
would start cost-benefit analysis for its major new investments. MOT checks whether the
Cost-Benefit Ratio of major new project exceeds one and also evaluates the Net Present
Value of the project. Table 1-2 introduces major projects, benefit components, cost
components, benefit evaluation periods, and the discount rate MOT applies to the
analysis. Although the Ministry has not made public its detailed analytical methods, a
former MOT director-general H. Kayahara has said, "The concept of probabilities, such
as the probability that the volume of cargo will double in ten years, has not been
27
incorporated into the analysis at all until now," implying that now MOT relies highly on a
deterministic scenario in its analyses [Morisugi and Kayahara 1998].
Re-evaluation Systems for Public Works
In March 1998 MOT announced that it would start re-evaluation systems for its
ongoing projects [1998b]. The Ministry will re-evaluate the effectiveness of a project
five years after the budget appropriation is first authorized and apply cost-benefit analysis
if necessary. As a result of the re-evaluation, MOT can change or abandon a project if
warranted.
28
Table 1-1: Long-term development plans and their authority in Japan
Infrastructure Long-term Plan Authority
Railway Regional railway master plans The Minister of Transportation
Shinkansen master plan
Airport Airport investment 5-yr. plan
Seaport Seaport investment 5-yr. plan
Seaport master plans
Road Road investment 5-yr. plan The Minister of Construction
City plans
Highway master plan
Source: Doboku Gakkai (1991)
Table 1-2: Major projects and cost-benefit components Japan's
Ministry of Transportation analyses
Project Railway New railway in recent developed town/
New underground rapid transit/ etc.
Airport New airport/
New runway (including expansion)
Seaport New deep-water berth
Benefit quantified Reduced transportation cost/
Timesaving/ etc.
Cost quantified Construction cost/
Operation cost/ etc.
Discount rate 4% per year
Benefit valuation period 30 - 50 years
Source: Japan, Ministry of Transportation (1997)
29
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CHAPTER 2
UNCERTAINTIES AND RISKS
IN TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
The project evaluations made by Japan's Ministry of Transportation are based on
a simple deterministic scenario. In the real world, however, transportation infrastructure
investments face diverse uncertainties and risks. This chapter first presents cases in
which there is the difference between forecasted demand and actual demand and then
introduces those uncertainties and risks faced by the transportation infrastructure using a
dichotomy: market uncertainties and project uncertainties.
Forecasted Demand and Actual Demand
It is very difficult to forecast future transportation demand accurately. In
forecasting future transportation demand, usually many model specifications are
constructed and compared with each other in order to obtain the specification that has the
most rational explanatory powers. Even a model that fits past data very well, however,
does not guarantee the accurate prediction of actual demand in the future.
Table 2-1 shows the difference between the forecasted demand for seaport cargo
throughout Japan and actual demand. Each forecast, except for the last two, contains an
error that is not negligible. Table 2-2 compares the forecasts for international air
passengers throughout Japan, five years in advance, with the actual numbers, and Table
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2-3 shows a similar comparison predicted ten years before the fact. As is the case with
seaport cargo, most forecasts contain errors that cannot be ignored. In addition, the
longer the forecasting perspective becomes, the larger the error tends to be.
The difficulty of forecasting also exists for individual projects. For example,
although the forecast predicted that Kansai International Airport would accommodate
157,000 aircraft in 1995 [Japan, Ministry of Transportation 1981c], the actual figure was
107,000, or about two-thirds of the forecast [Kansai International Airport Company
1999]. Table 2-4, showing the case of annual passengers at the Tokyo International
Airport (so-called Haneda Airport), indicates a similar discrepancy between the predicted
and actual figures, an error that increases over a ten year span. The difficulty of
forecasting is a universal problem, i.e., not peculiar to Japan. Table 2-5 shows a case in
the United States. All of this implies that developers must recognize the risks when they
rely totally on a simple deterministic forecast.
Uncertainties in Transportation Infrastructure Investment
Many factors can create a disparity between actual demand and forecasted
demand. In addition to risks relating to demand, an investment in transportation
infrastructure faces other types of risks, such as the increase of construction costs. Here,
the dichotomy of market uncertainties and project uncertainties is applied to
transportation projects.
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Table 2-1: Actual and forecasted demand for seaport cargo
throughout Japan (5-year perspective)
Year Volume (100 million ton) Error
Target Forecasted A. Actual B. Forecast C. B/A (%)
1965 1960 8.3 6.2 75
1969 1964 16.0 10.5 66
1972 1967 22.2 15.3 69
1975 1970 25.3 33.8 134
1980 1975 29.1 37.0 127
1985 1980 28.3 41.0 145
1990 1985 32.5 30.8 95
1995 1990 34.2 34.0 99
Sources:
1. Actual Data:
Error: B/A %
Average 101
Average Deviation from 100% 25
Japan, Ministry of Transportation (1998c)
2. Forecast: Japan, Ministry of Transportation (1991a, 1986a, 1981a, 1976a, 1971a, 1968,
1965, and 1961)
Note: Actual data use calendar year while forecasts use fiscal year.
Figure 2-1: Actual and forecasted demand for seaport cargo throughout Japan
(5-year perspective)
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Table 2-2: Actual and forecasted demand for international
air passengers throughout Japan (5-year perspective)
Year Passenger (million) Error
Target Forecasted A. Actual B. Forecast C. B/A (%)
1971 1966 4.3 3.5 81
1975 1970 7.9 10.0 127
1980 1975 12.1 15.0 124
1985 1980 17.6 25.5 145
1990 1985 31.0 27.0 87
1995 1990 43.6 45.0 103
Error: B/A %
Average 111
Average Deviation from 100% 22
Sources:
1. Actual Data: Japan, Ministry of Justice (1998)
2. Forecast: Japan, Ministry of Transportation (1991b, 1986b,
1967)
1981b, 1976b, 1971b, and
Figure 2-2: Actual and forecasted demand for international air passengers
throughout Japan (5-year perspective)
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Table 2-3: Actual and forecasted demand for international
air passengers throughout Japan (10-year perspective)
Year Passenger (million) Error
Target Forecasted A. Actual B. Forecast C. B/A (%)
1980 1970 12.1 20.0 165
1985 1975 17.6 27.0 153
1990 1980 31.0 39.5 127
1995 1985 43.6 37.9 87
Error: B/A %
Average 133
Average Deviation from 100% 40
Sources:
1. Actual Data: Japan, Ministry of Justice (1998)
2. Forecast: Japan, Ministry of Transportation (1986b, 1981b, 1976b, and 1971b)
Figure 2-3: Actual and forecasted demand for international air passengers
throughout Japan (10-year perspective)
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Table 2-4: Actual and forecasted demand for passengers
at Haneda airport
Year Passenger (million) Error
Target Forecasted A. Actual B. Forecast C. B/A (%)
1985 24.9 28.0 112
1990 1983 38.9 43.0 111
1995 43.9 54.0 123
Error: B/A %
Average 115
Average Deviation from 100% 15
Sources:
1. Actual Data: Japan, Ministry of Transportation (1998d)
2. Forecast: Japan, Ministry of Transportation (1983)
Table 2-5: Actual and forecasted demand for
New England Region Airports
Planning Horizon Average Error Range of Errors
(years) (%) (%)
Five 23 64 to 196
Ten 41 58 to240
Fifteen 78 66 to 310
Source: Maldonado (1990)
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Market Uncertainties
Market uncertainties are those that affect overall market conditions with respect to
a transportation development plan. Risks resulting from these uncertainties cannot be
avoided.
In terms of cost and benefit, the success or failure of a transportation
infrastructure development depends mainly on the growth of demand. The growth of the
corresponding market throughout Japan is supposed to significantly affect the demand
growth for an individual project. The growth in the number of passengers throughout
Japan, for example, may significantly affect the demand growth for an individual airport
development project, and the growth in the volume of cargo throughout Japan may
significantly affect the growth in demand for an individual seaport development project.
Apparently, there are many factors that affect overall national market growths.
Below, four such factors are identified: GDP growth, technological innovations,
contingent events, and currency markets.
* GDP growth
The national economic situation has a great impact on transportation demand.
Usually, there is a strong correlation between GDP and transportation demand.
Accordingly, in forecasting future transportation demand, GDP is often used as an
explanatory variable. If GDP does not grow as expected, forecasts will tend to
overestimate actual demand. In periods during which GDP grew more than expected, the
number of both national airport passengers and national seaport cargoes generally grew
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more than forecasted. In contrast, during those periods in which GDP grew less than
expected, the opposite was true (Table 2-6, and Figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3).
e Technological innovations
Apart from the economic situation, technological innovations sometimes
drastically change the structure of transportation demand. The advent of air travel, for
example, drastically decreased the need for international passengers to travel by sea. The
emergence of container transportation systems also drastically decreased the volume of
general bulk cargo.
* Contingent events
Contingent events sometimes significantly affect transportation demand. Two
examples are illustrative: two oil crises, and the Gulf War. Oil crises of 1973 and 1979
seemed to have negative impacts on seaport cargo in Japan (Figure 2-1). In addition, the
Gulf War of 1991 seemed to have a negative impact on international air travel.
* Currency markets
While a strong yen is supposed to increase imports and travelers going abroad, a
weak yen is supposed to increase exports and travelers coming to Japan.
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Table 2-6: Actual and planned GDP for Japan
Year GDP growth rate (%) Error
Period Planned A. Actual B. Planned C. B/A (%)
1961-70 1961 10.1 7.2 71
1964-68 1964 10 8.1 81
1967-71 1967 9.9 8.2 83
1970-75 1970 5.5 10.6 193
1973-77 1973 3.6 9.4 261
1976-80 1976 4.4 6 136
1979-85 1979 3.7 5.7 154
1983-90 1979 4.3 4 93
1988-92 1988 4.2 3.75 89
Error: B/A %
Average 129
Average Deviation from 100% 47
Sources:
1. Actual: Japan, Economic Planning Agency (1996)
2. Plan: Japan, Chiiki Seibi Kodan (1995)
Note: Actual data use calendar year while plans use fiscal year.
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Project Uncertainties
Project uncertainties are those that affect an individual project only. Investing in
various projects can diversify the risks resulting from these uncertainties.
Apart from market uncertainties, each individual project faces various
uncertainties both at its construction stage and at its operation stage.
1) Construction stage
e Construction costs
The most typical project risk in transportation infrastructure development may be
the increase of construction costs. In the case of the Kansai International Airport, the
estimated cost before the construction was around 1 trillion Yen, while the actual cost
turned out to be about one and a half time this much [Gekkan Doyu Sha 1994]. Table 2-7
shows four examples of construction cost uncertainties in recent major container terminal
developments in Japan.
0 Construction schedule
In addition to construction costs, a construction schedule also contains
uncertainty. For example, the inauguration of Kansai International Airport was delayed
more than a year because of ground subsidence. In the case of Narita airport, the second
runway construction has not been developed yet because of the difficulty in purchasing
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Table 2-7: Estimate and actual cost of container
terminal construction in Japan (unit: 108 Yen)
Seaport Terminal A. Actual B. Estimate A/B(%)
Y 1 142 149 95
2 136 150 91
K 1 170 147 116
2 243 179 136
Error: A/B %
Average 109
Average Deviation from 100% 16
Source: Japan, Ministry of Transportation (1999a)
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the runway site, although the Japanese government has desired to do so for almost three
decades [Koku Shinko Zaidan 1997].
2) Operation stage
As it has been mentioned in the section on market uncertainties, the success or
failure of a transportation infrastructure development mainly depends on the growth in
demand. Apart from the growth of demand in the national market as a whole, each
individual project faces demand growth uncertainties specific to itself. In some projects,
rates of demand growth might be greater than the rate of demand growth for the entire
national market, and in some projects, they might be smaller.
There appear to be many factors that affect the growth in demand for an
individual project. Below, two factors are identified: regional socioeconomic conditions
and the level of service accomplished by the transportation infrastructure. These two
factors are somewhat interrelated.
Regional socioeconomic conditions
Hinterland conditions for transportation infrastructure to be developed are not
homogeneous throughout Japan. In some regions, the rates of gross regional product
(GRP) growth might be greater than the rate of GDP growth for the entire country. This
might also be true for rates of population growth. These factors may create a deviation in
demand growth for a particular project from that of the national average. Furthermore, in
the case of the volume of cargo, for example, the development of an industrial complex
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in a region may significantly affect the demand growth for a container terminal to be
developed.
e The level of service
The level of service accomplished by an individual project, such as the frequency
of services, is one of the key factors that determine the attractiveness of the transportation
infrastructure developed. Even though a newly developed transportation infrastructure
may have advantages over existing infrastructures in terms of access cost and access time
for users in its potential hinterland, demand would not be realized if the level of service
were low. Airports that have more frequent flights and more diverse destinations, for
example, are likely to attract more passengers than those that do not. Seaports that have
more frequent liner services and more diverse destinations attract more cargo than those
that do not.
Although the level of service accomplished by a transportation infrastructure is
not totally independent of the factors introduced in the section on regional socioeconomic
conditions, the success of an airport or a seaport authority in port sales sometimes affects
the result. For example, if the port authority succeeds well in port sales, it can capture a
large portion of its potential hinterland passengers or cargoes, and vice versa.
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CHAPTER 3
EVALUATING TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
USING DYNAMIC STRATEGIC PLANNING
This chapter presents the concept and advantages of Dynamic Strategic Planning
(DSP) using the example of an airport investment. This simple example was arbitrarily
created in order to explain the concept and advantages of DSP as well as the defects of
Net Present Value (NPV) based on a deterministic scenario. This chapter also introduces
two major Real Options valuation methods: the Black-Scholes equation and Monte-Carlo
simulation.
Imaginary project (Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3)
e An airport authority (AA) is deciding on an investment strategy for an airport (AP).
" The AP master plan contains three identical runways.
e The construction cost of each runway is $500 million. The construction of a runway
takes AA only one year.
* If the demand for AP is high, medium, or low, respectively, AP provides the net
benefit of $100 million, $50 million, or $25 million, respectively, for the first
operation year. The three outcomes are equally plausible. The annual net benefit is
supposed to increase 20%/year regardless of the net benefit of the first year.
* Because of the capacity, each runway can provide the net benefit of $100 million per
year at most.
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Figure 3-1: Assumptions of imaginary project
Discount rate 4%
Construction cost $500 million/RW
Net Benefit
Growth rate 20% /year
High $100 million
Initial net benefit Medium $50 million
Low $25 million
Maximum Benefit $100 million/year/RW
Figure 3-2: Schedule of imaginary project
First five year operation
Initial decision
Year 0 1 2 - 6 - 16
ti t
Construction Second decision
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Figure 3-3: Decision structure of imaginary project
Phase 1 decision Benefit Phase 2 decision
1. Keep operation
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" If AA first develops two runways, it will have the opportunity to add one runway
after five years of operation. If AA first develops one runway, it will have the
opportunity to add one runway or two runways after five years of operation.
" AA evaluates the project for 16 years (one year construction and 15 year operation)
using a 4% discount rate.
NPV based on a deterministic scenario (simple NPV)
The simple NPV is calculated as follows:
16 Benefitt - Costt
NPV = I
,=1 (1+0.04)t
Suppose AA totally relies on the medium scenario (deterministic scenario). The
simple NPV of the development of two runways, $525 million, is greater than that of one
runway, $471 million. Based on this deterministic scenario, AA would decide to start
developing two runways (Figure 3-4).
Expected NPV taking into account uncertainties (Base Expected NPV)
Even if AA's decision were based on the expected NPV taking into account
uncertainties in the net benefit, AA still would decide to start developing two runways
because the expected NPV of the two runway development, $509 million, is greater than
that of the one runway development, $441 million (Figure 3-5). (In this thesis, Base
Expected NPV is defined as the expected NPV of an initial investment without
considering expansions.)
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Figure 3-4: Simple NPV based on a deterministic scenario (unit: $million)
1. Develop one runway
471
525
2Develop two runways
525
Figure 3-5: Expected NPV taking into account uncertainties (Base Expected NPV,
unit: $million)
Benefit
0.33
High
58
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Here, the expected NPV of the initial investment (Base Expected NPV) is smaller
than that of the deterministic scenario. This is not a universal property. This happens
because of asymmetric outcomes around the medium outcome.
Dynanic Strategic Planning
DSP is the approach that takes into account future uncertainties and risks and
insures managerial flexibility. Applying DSP to the project evaluation, neither of the two
NPV valuations is correct. AA should recognize the Real Options value of adding one or
two runways. If AA first develops two runways and the benefit is high, for example, it
should add one runway after the five years of operation because the resulting NPV,
$1,127 million, is greater than the NPV without adding it, $943 million; if the benefit is
medium or low, however, it should not add one runway (Figure 3-6). Assuming each
outcome occurs equally, the option value of having the other runway development project
is $61 million (Table 3-1: Initial decision 2).
The essence of DSP is evaluating multiple stage decisions. Here, there are
decision opportunities at two stages: the initial decision and the decision at the end of the
five years of operation. Taking into account the option value, the Total NPV of initially
developing one runway, $608 million, is greater than that of initially developing two
runways, $570 million. This implies that, if the objective function of AA is to maximize
the NPV, DSP increases the value of the project by $38 million.
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Figure 3-6: NPV based on Dynamic Strategic Planning (unit: $million)
Phase 1 decision Benefit Phase 2 decision
1. Keep operation
588
0.33
High 2. Add one runway
957 773
3. Add two runways
957
1. Keep operation
471
0.33
1. Develop one runwa Medium 1 2. Add one runway
608 605 605
3. Add two runways
562
1. Keep operation
263
0.33
Low 2. Add one runway
263 159
608 3. Add two runways
-117
1. Keep operation
0.33
High 943
1,127
2. Add one runway
1,127
1. Keep operation
0.33
2. Develop two runwa Medium 525
570 25 2.Add one runway
482
1. Keep operation
0.33
Low 58
58
2. Add one runway
-218
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Table 3-1: Total NPV Including Option Value (unit: $million)
Decision taken in second period
Initial decision: 1. Develop one runway
Benefit Outcome Second decision Option value
Keep Operation Add one runway Add two runways
High 588 773 957 369
Medium 471 605 562 133
Low 263 159 -117 0
Total NPV, $608 million = Base Expected NPV*, $441 million (=(588+471+263)/3)
+ Option Value, $167 million (=(369+133+0)/3)
*Base Expected NPV: Expected NPV of Phase 1 investment without Phase 2
investment
Initial decision: 2. Develop two runways
Benefit Outcome Second decision Option value
Keep Operation Add one runway
High 943 1127 184
Medium 525 482 0
Low 58 -218 0
Total NPV, $570 million = Base Expected NPV, $509 million (=(943+525+58)/3)
+ Option Value, $61 million (=(184+0+0)/3)
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Option calculator
In this example, the option value is calculated based on three discrete outcomes
that are equally plausible regardless of whether AA invests in one runway or two
runways using decision tree analysis. In the real evaluation, however, the situation might
be more complicated. Amram and Kulatilaka introduce the following three general
solution methods of Real Options: PDE (Partial Difference Equation), Dynamic
Programming, and Simulations (Figure 3-7) [Amram and Kulatilaka 1999]. This chapter
introduces the Black-Scholes equation (PDE) and Monte-Carlo simulation that become
useful tools for the case study in the next chapter.
PDE/Black-Scholes equation
e Black-Scholes equation
The PDE approach solves a partial differential equation that equates the change in
option value with the change in the value of the tracking portfolio [Amram and
Kulatilaka 1999]. Among PDE approaches the Black-Scholes equation is popular
because it provides a simple solution and a quick answer when appropriate. The equation
is:
V = N(dl)*A - N(d2)*X*exp(-rf*T)
Here,
V = Current value of call option
A = Current value of underlying asset
X = Cost of investment
rf = Risk-free rate of return
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T = Time to expiration
N(dl) and N(d2) are the values of the normal distribution at dl and d2
dl = [ln(A/X) + (r + 0.5*&2)*T]/(a*T 5 )
d2 = d1 - *T0 5
G = Volatility of the underlying asset
The Black-Scholes equation is applicable to this airport development example
because this project can be seen as a project having a European call option that can be
exercised at the end of year six (expansion option). Applying the Black-Scholes equation
to the example, each variable is defined as follows:
A = Expected value of additional net benefit flow by adding one or two runways
in the year of second decision, the year six (Current value of underlying asset).
Precisely,
A 16 A enefitt16t-
t=8 (1+ 0.04)t6
Here,
ABenefit Net benefit with runway addition
-Net benefit without runway addition
X = Construction cost of one or two runways
rf = 4% (assumption)
T = 6 years (one year for construction of the initially invested runway and five
years of operation)
Y = Volatility of the underlying asset
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Figure 3-7: Solution Methods and Option Calculators
Identify and Define Real Options
Establish the Mathematical Representation
Choose Solution Method/Option Calculator
PDE Dynamic Programming
(e.g. Black-Scholes) (Binomial Model)
Simulations
(Monte Carlo Method)
Source: Amram and Kulatilaka (1999)
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Step 2
e Option value in decision 2
Because of the ease of explanation, the option value in decision 2 is calculated
first. Here, three cases defined above (high, medium, and low net benefit) are used in
valuing the underlying asset (additional net benefit by adding a runway on two runway
airfield) and determining its volatility. When AA initially invests in two runways, the
expected value of three cases can be seen as the current value of the underlying asset
(Table 3-2). The value of each case (high, medium, or low) can be seen as a value that
the underlying asset can have at the year six. Then the ratio of each value to the expected
value is calculated. Standard deviation of the distribution of natural log of these ratios is
assumed as six-year volatility. Annual volatility is obtained by dividing it by six.
Then, using necessary information as input of the Black-Scholes equation, the
option value of adding a runway on two runway airfield is obtained (Table 3-3).
* Option value in decision 1
The option value of two additional runways when one runway is initially
developed is the sum of the option value of adding a runway on one runway airfield and
the option value of adding a runway on two runway airfield (the latter value is calculated
above). The former value is calculated as the same way of the latter (Table 3-4, and 3-5).
It should be noted that this value is different from the option value of adding two
runways on one runway airfield because AA does not have to simultaneously add two
runways always. Thus, the option value of one additional runway when two runways are
initially developed (decision 2) is $81 million, and that of one or two additional runways
when one runway is initially developed (decision 1) is $226 million, the sum of $144
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million and $81 million as explained. Both are similar to values estimated by the
decision tree analysis (Table 3-6).
Simulation/Monte-Carlo Method
The simulation approach averages the value of the optimal strategy at the decision
date for thousands of possible outcomes. (A representation of a system at a particular
point in time is usually referred as a Monte-Carlo simulation [Winston 1994].) In this
method, the optimal investment strategy at the end of each path is determined and the
payoff is calculated. The current value of the option is found by averaging the payoffs
and then discounting the average back to the present. This method can handle many
aspects of real world applications, including complicated decision rules and complex
relationships between the option value and the underlying asset [Amram and Kulatilaka
1999]. One of difficulties with Monte-Carlo simulation is specification of the
probabilities for different results for each of the variables [Zerbe and Dively 1994].
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Table 3-2: Volatility of underlying (adding a runway on two runway airfield)
Asset value ($million) Ratio to Expected value Ln (Ratio)
Expected 424
Low 132 0.311 -1.169
Medium 426 1.006 0.006
High 714 1.683 0.521
Volatility (6 yrs.) 86.6%
Annual Volatility 14.4%
Table 3-3: Option value of adding a runway
on two runway airfield
A $424M
X $481M
rf 0.04
T 6 yrs.
o 14.4%
dl N(dl) d2 N(d2)
0.486 0.687 0.133 0.553
Call Value $81M
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Table 3-4: Volatility of underlying (adding a runway on one runway airfield)
Case Asset value ($million) Ratio to Expected value Ln (Ratio)
Expected 508
Low 159 0.313 -1.161
Medium 650 1.279 0.246
High 715 1.408 0.342
Volatility (6 yrs.) 84.1%
Annual Volatility 14.0%
Table 3-5: Option value
on one runway airfield
A $508M
X $481M
rf 0.04
T 6 yrs.
a 14.0%
of adding a runway
dl N(dl) d2 N(d2)
1.016 0.845 0.673 0.749
Table 3-6: Comparison of option values
by two methods (unit: $million)
Decision Option Value
Decision Tree Black-Scholes
1 167 226
2 61 81
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ICall Value 1$144MI
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CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY: EVALUATING A CONTAINER TERMINAL DEVELOPMENT
IN JAPAN
This case study analyzes an actual container terminal development project in
Japan. The objective is to construct a model helpful to Japan's Ministry of
Transportation (MOT) in evaluating projects using the Dynamic Strategic Planning
(DSP) approach. Recognizing uncertainties and risks in projects and insuring decision
flexibility, MOT will be able systematically to find an optimal investment strategy in
terms of maximizing the Net Present Value (NPV) of a project. After the valuation of
case study, this chapter discusses what the government should consider in order to
effectively use DSP.
Presentation of the project for case study (Figures 4-1, and 4-2)
The project is to develop container berths in seaport A located in prefecture B,
which had no container berths. The seaport master plan was officially authorized in 1992
(Year 1). The plan was to develop a -10m berth and two -14m berths. In Year 1, the
port authority of Port A and MOT jointly started constructing a -10m berth and one of
the two -14m berths (Phase 1). (This means that major decisions, such as the details of
the budget, were made in 1991 [Year 0].) After five years of construction, at the end of
1996, the two berths were put into year around operation. There is no plan to start
constructing the other -14m berth (Phase 2) now.
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Figure 4-1: Simplified configuration of the project
Berth 1
Depth -14m
Length
Berth 2
Depth -14m
280m Length
Berth 3
Depth -10m
280m Length 170m
Container Terminal in Port A
Phase 1 (actual case)
Figure 4-2: Schedule of the project (Phase 1)
Decision made Inauguration
Year 0 - 6 -
First development started. Full operation started.
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Phase 2
Case study model and NPV valuation
Step 1. Construct Cost-Benefit Model
Framework of Model
Figure 4-3 illustrates the basic structure of the cost-benefit analysis. This model
is the basis for calculating the Net Present Value (NPV) for both the current MOT
valuation (conventional cost-benefit analysis) and the proposed DSP valuation.
Appendix 1 gives detailed explanations of the model.
Horizon of analysis
The benefit valuation period is set as 30 years because MOT uses this for
container terminal development projects. Thus the total analysis period, including the
construction stage, is 35 years.
Simple NPV based on a deterministic scenario (Current MOT's approach)
The NPV only for Phase 1 (without Phase 2 investment) is calculated based on a
deterministic scenario. (Here, medium cases are used as the deterministic scenario for all
uncertainties.) This is the conventional cost-benefit analysis that MOT now basically
uses in evaluating projects. The resulting NPV for this phase 1 is positive, 10,185
million Yen, so this investment is justifiable by the current MOT criterion (Appendix1:
Table Al-5).
Actually, under current circumstance, MOT decides what scenario to use for the
deterministic case. While MOT carries out sensitivity analyses to deal with future
uncertainties and risks, there is no guarantee that these systematically lead MOT to
optimal investment strategies.
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Figure 4-3: Framework of the Cost-Benefit Model
Cost Model
Construction cost
O eration cost
Demand Growth
Benefit Model
Transportation cost savings
Transportation time savings
Salvage value of facilities
Net benefit in each year
Discount rate
Sum over periods
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IeN present value of project I
Step 2. Identify uncertainties and risks
Market uncertainty
The growth in demand for container cargo throughout Japan was chosen here to
represent a market uncertainty. It is assumed that Port A's potential hinterland demand
growth will be the same as the national demand growth. Using the latest ten year data
throughout Japan, the average growth rate of the container cargo market is 5.9%/year (the
medium case), with the standard deviation of 2.4%/year growth rate (Table 4-1 and
Appendix 2-2).
Project uncertainty
* Construction stage
Construction cost is one of the major sources of project uncertainties. Here, using
the data in Table 2-7 and assuming that the ratio of actual to estimated cost is
lognormally distributed, the Bracket-Median Method gives three discrete percentages of
actual to estimated cost (high case: 129%; medium case: 108%; low case: 90%) [Neely
1998]. Each case has equal probability (Appendix 2-1). The original data obtained are
assumed as being for a medium-cost case.
* Operation stage
The port's market share in the potential hinterland (the ratio of the container
volume handled at the terminal to the total in the hinterland) was chosen to represent a
project uncertainty at the operation stage. Whether the port authority succeeds in port
sales or not may affect the share the port acquires. Observations of two similar seaport
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projects imply there are two stages of uncertainties (Appendix 2-3). The average share
each port acquires during first five years of operation is 9.9%, with the standard deviation
of 7.4% share. (The distribution of this share is then assumed as being lognormal.) After
five years of operation, using the data of the two similar seaports, the port is expected to
gain an additional 2.4 % of share each year on average (the medium case), with the
standard deviation of 0.5%/year share.
Step 3. Identify strategic opportunities and options
1 " decision at Year 0 (for Phase 1)
This section explores two kinds of investments for Phase 1. The first is to build
only one -14m berth (Choice 1). This is not the actual case but an alternative investment
that might have been better in terms of the NPV. The second choice is to build one -10m
berth and one of two -14m berths as is the case with the actual investment (Choice 2).
(Figure 4-4). (Investing in only -10m berth could also be an alternative; however,
because a -14m berth is advantageous for a seaport in terms of simple capacity and types
of ships accommodated, and because the purpose of this case study is to demonstrate
DSP, the case simplifies the choices.)
2nd decision at Year 10 (for Phase 2)
At the end of Phase 1 (Year 10, the last year of the second five year seaport
investment plan after Year 0), MOT will have the opportunity in Phase 2 to start an
additional investment during the next Seaport Investment Five-year Plan (Figure 4-5).
The decision for Phase 2 depends on the outcome of Phase 1. Decision-makers can take
66
advantage of information on the Phase 1 construction cost and the demand growth from
Year 6 to Year 10 during the first five years of operation. The information on
construction cost is assumed as being perfect information, i.e., if the construction cost is
high, medium, or low, respectively, for Phase 1, the construction cost for Phase 2 will
also be high, medium, or low, respectively. (This is not necessarily real; however,
geological conditions seem to explain significant portions of the uncertainty in marine
construction, accordingly, the information of adjacent terminal cost can be very useful.)
No resolution of the market uncertainty (the national market growth) is assumed here.
Both market and project uncertainties in demand remain after Year 11. The information
on project demand for the first five years of operation is not perfect information.
Nevertheless, the information on the share acquired during Phase 1 is helpful for
decision-makers to determine what strategy they should take for Phase 2. It is interpreted
that Real Options for expansion can be exercised at the end of the second Seaport
Investment Five-year Plan here. Figure 4-6 illustrates simplified decision structure.
Decision Tree Analysis
Before proceeding to a precise Real Options valuation, a simplified decision tree
analysis is carried out to help decision-makers understand the essence of DSP. Three
outcomes of construction costs have been already defined above. Applying the Bracket
Median method to the demand uncertainties in Table 4-1, three outcomes for each
demand uncertainty are calculated as equally plausible scenario (Table 4-2, and Appendix
2). Then, three outcomes of demand growths are created by convoluting three outcomes
of market demand growths and three outcomes of project shares (Appendix 3).
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Table 4-1: Summary of uncertainties
Type Uncertainty Statistic % Note
Market Market Growth Average 5.9 annual growth rate
Standard Deviation 2.4 around Average
Project Construction Cost High case 129
Medium case 108 of estimated cost
Low case 90
Port Share (base) Average 9.9 of potential hinterland
(first 5-yr operation) Standard Deviation 7.4 around Average
Port Share Average 2.4 annual additional share to base share
(after 5-yr operation) Standard Deviation 0.5 around Average
Figure 4-4: Choice for Phase 1 (at Year 0)
Choice 1: Build -14m berth
Choice 2: Build --10m berth & -14m berth
Figure 4-5: Strategic decision opportunities
5 yr. plan 1st 2nd 3rd 4th-7th
Year 0 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-35
Phase 1 2
Stage Initial decision Construction Operation (expansion)
* Option of expansion decision at Year 10
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Figure 4-6: Structure of decisions for two phases
Phase 1
Decision Cost/Demand
Phase 2
Decision Demand
1. No expansion
?
1. Build -14m 2. Add -14m berth
3. Add -10m and -14m berths
1. No expansion
2. Add -14m berth
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Pay Off
Table 4-2: Summary of uncertainties for decision tree analysis
Type Uncertainty Case % Note
Market Market Growth High 8.3
Medium 5.9 annual growth rate
Low 3.6
Project Construction Cost High 129
Medium 108 of estimated cost
Low 90
Port Share (base) High 17.1
(first 5-yr operation) Medium 7.1* of potential hinterland
Low 3.0
Port Share (addition) High 2.9
(first 5-yr operation) Medium 2.4 annual additional share to base share
Low 1.9
* The medium share here is different from the average in Table 4-1 because the
distribution is assumed as being lognormal (Appendix 2-3).
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The optional decision for Phase 2 maximizes the expected NPV given
observations of construction cost and demand growth during Phase 1. For example, in
the actual investment case (Choice 2), if construction cost is medium, the best choice for
Phase 2 is just to keep operation (no expansion) when the demand is medium or low, and
to add the other -14m berth when the demand is high (Figure 4-7). Then, the set of best
Phase 2 decisions that gives maximum expected NPV, given each scenario, constitutes
the total NPV of a decision for Phase 1. The decision that has the higher total NPV
should be taken for Phase 1.
In this case study, while Choice 1 (Build -14m berth for Phase 1) gives the Total
NPV of 12,078 million Yen, Choice 2 (Build -1Om berth and -14m berth for Phase 1)
gives the Total NPV of10,862 million Yen. This implies that applying DSP to MOT's
investment strategy, Choice 1 is the best and increases the NPV of 1,216 million Yen
compared to Choice 2 if MOT's objective is to maximize the NPV of the project. The
best choice for Phase 2 depends on outcomes of construction cost and demand growth
during Phase 1. (Appendix 3 shows the entire result.)
Step 4. Choose Real Options value calculator
Monte-Carlo simulation and Black-Scholes equation
Although the decision tree analysis illustrates the concept of DSP, it lacks the
precision because of simplifications in creating discrete outcomes of uncertainties in this
case study. For example, only three outcomes for demand uncertainties (high, medium,
and low) are used throughout each Phase in this case. However, if there are three
scenarios for a year, 310 outcomes should arise for ten year period in reality. Also, the
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Figure 4-7: Decision tree analysis (portion of result)
Initial Decision Construction Cost
0.33
High
Phase 1 Demand Second Decision
9,417
1. No expansion
0.33
High
18,446
18,446
1. No expansion
0.33
Medium
10,502
10,349
1. No expansion
0.33
Low
7,600
7,091
1. Build -14m
0.33
Medium
12,078 12,183
12,078
0.33
Low
14,635
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0.33
High
8,226
1. No expansion
0.33
High
16,911
16,911
1. No expansion
2. Build -10m and
10,862
8,735
1. No expansion
0.33
6,682
5,477
0.33
Low
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0.33
Medium
0.33
Medium
10,961 9,289
assumption of lognormality on the distribution resulting from the convolution of market
demand and project share is an approximation (Appendix 3).
The Monte-Carlo simulation fits this case study in valuing Real Options value.
Because statistical references (mean, standard deviation, and distribution) of demand
uncertainties are now determined, simulation overcomes the problems of decision tree
analysis explained above.
Second, the Black-Scholes equation is also applicable to the calculation of the
option value here because the expansion opportunity at Year 10 is seen as European call
option as is the case with the Chapter 3 example.
Step 5. Calculate DSP-based NPV (with Real Options value)
Monte-Carlo simulation
Monte-Carlo simulation is applied to the determination of demand growth paths.
First, using the statistical information defined above, ten realizations of demand growth
paths are generated. The expected NPV of the ten realizations for the Phase 1 investment
(either Choice 1 or Choice 2 without phase 2 expansion) gives a Base Expected NPV,
which is defined in Chapter 3, for the Phase 1 facilities. Second, for each one of the ten
realizations above, ten further realizations of demand paths are generated for the period
after Year 11 (thus resulting in 100 realizations of project demand growth paths for the
Phase 2 decision) (Appendix 4). Here, construction cost is dealt with as the three discrete
variables defined above.
Option value is realized when the expected value of expansion, given information
on Phase 1, is greater than the expected value of non-expansion. The option value arises
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by resolutions of demand uncertainty and cost uncertainty. (Because market demand
uncertainty is never resolved, it has nothing to do with option value here. All option
value coming from the resolution of demand uncertainty is attributed to the resolution of
the project share uncertainty here.)
NPV with Real Options value (Total NPV)
" Choice 1: Building a -14m berth for Phase 1 and exercise the suitable option when it is
most advantageous for Phase 2 (Appendix 4: Table A4-2)
Total NPV (13,199 million Yen) = Base Expected NPV (9,620 million Yen)
+ Option value (3,579 million Yen)
e Choice 2: Building a -10m berth and a -14m berth for Phase 1, and exercise the
option when it is advantageous for Phase 2 (Appendix 4: Table A4-3)
Total NPV (12,227 million Yen) = Base Expected NPV (12,017 million Yen)
+ Option value (210 million Yen)
Black-Scholes equation
Applying the same method explained in Chapter 3 to this case study, the Real
Options value is obtained as follows (Appendix 5):
e Choice 1 (Appendix 5: Tables A5-2, and A5-4)
Option Value = 4,378 million Yen
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This value is similar to that of the Monte-Carlo simulation (3,579 million Yen) in
terms of both absolute value and the percentage of the Base Expected value (45.5% vs.
37.2%).
* Choice 2 (Appendix 5: Table A5-6)
Option Value = 61 million Yen
Although this might seem to be very different from the Monte-Carlo outcome
(210 million Yen), it is quite similar in terms of the percentage of the Base Expected
value (0.5% vs. 1.7%).
Implications of the case study
Simple NPV vs. Base Expected NPV
The Base Expected NPV (the expected NPV of Phase 1 investment without Phase
2 investment) of Choice 2, 12,017 million Yen, is greater than its simple NPV, 10,185
million Yen. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this is not a universal property. If the
deterministic scenario is very optimistic, the simple NPV can be greater than the Base
Expected NPV. Even if a deterministic scenario is set for all medium cases, asymmetric
outcomes can both increase and decrease the Base Expected NPV. This implies that, if
MOT relies on the simple NPV valuation alone, the Ministry might make wrong
decisions because the valuation is not correct even when option value is excluded. If
uncertainties and risks are evaluated appropriately, the Base Expected NPV gives a more
precise valuation.
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Option Value and Total NPV
Although the option value in Choice 2 is very small, that in Choice 1 is
significant. This implies that MOT might underestimate the project value in some cases
if it does not value the Real Options of a project, which might result in failure to invest in
a project that actually has a positive Total NPV (= Base Expected NPV + Option Value).
Second, the two methods of option calculation gave similar values in this case
study. The Black-Scholes equation can be the quick solution, in particular, when the
volatility of the present value of net benefit flow is known a priori.
DSP
It should be noted that the Total NPV of Choice 1 is greater than that of Choice 2
when the option value is taken into account. This happens because Choice 1 has higher
flexibility than Choice 2 when significant uncertainties exist. This implies that the
recognition of uncertainties and the incorporation of flexibility into projects can increase
the total value of the projects. This conclusion is the same as that of decision tree
analysis although there is minor difference in calculated NPVs.
When the objective of MOT is to maximize the NPV of the project, DSP suggests
that MOT should invest in one berth at first, then add berths based on the outcomes of
construction cost and demand.
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What the Government Should Consider in Order to Effectively Use DSP
Applying DSP to the government's decision-making means change not only in
valuation methodology but also in the government's rigid systems. In order to maximize
the value of Real Options, the government should consider changing its perception with
regard to master plans, five-year investment plans, and the regulation regarding subsidies.
Master Plans
Because it takes some time before a master plan is authorized under the current
procedures set up by the national government, as Chapter 1 explains, a plan to be
authorized should be regarded as a set of investment opportunities and be designed so as
to ensure flexible expansions (or contraction, transfer use, closure) as much as possible.
For example, as can be seen from the case study, having the plan of another -14m berth
gives an additional option value to that of the actual investment. Additionally, it is
important that the plan ensures the all the deployment strategies, such as those assumed
in the case study.
It would also be worthwhile for the government to consider shortening the
examination period required to authorize a plan. This would create the defacto effect of
Real Options by increasing the flexibility of the authorized plan.
Investment Five-year Plans
Although most current investment five-year plans are not completely inflexible, it
is difficult to initiate a project that has not been originally incorporated into the plan.
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This is particularly true in the case of seaports and airports because the seaport and
airport investment five-year plans designate individual seaports and airports to be funded
during the five year period. If an investment five-year plan designates individual
projects, it should not totally exclude other projects. It is beneficial for option values for
the plan to include conditionally some projects that do not look very attractive at the time
when the five-year plan is made. Furthermore, a five-year plan should not stick to
initially included projects if they become unattractive as a result of changed
circumstances.
Subsidies by the National Government
The Law Regarding Appropriate Enforcement of Subsidies, enacted in 1955, may
be one of the major reasons why it is very difficult for local governments to abandon
projects even when the investment appears to be unwise. According to this law, if local
governments abandon the facilities developed using a subsidy, they have to return an
amount equal to the subsidy to the national treasury, as Chapter 1 explains. Because the
financial contribution of the national government to transportation infrastructure is
usually large, the abandonment option is hardly available for local governments.
Consequently, local governments tend to stick to original usage. Flexible employment of
this act within an acceptable level would be helpful to increase the option value, and, in
turn, the Total NPV of a project.
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Conclusion of the case study (as answers to the questions presented in Introduction)
e The valuation method based on DSP works better than the system MOT currently
uses in terms of the precision of valuation.
" DSP has advantages over the current system in terms of its ability to increase the real
value of projects.
" Accordingly, it would be beneficial for the Japanese government to incorporate DSP
into its transportation infrastructure investment.
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CHAPTER 5
POLICY ANALYSIS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
OF DYNAMIC STRATEGIC PLANNING
IN JAPAN'S MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 show that there are uncertainties and risks in transportation
infrastructure developments, which, if not taken into systematic consideration, might lead
to unsound judgments. This would be particularly true if decision-makers relied on a
single a priori deterministic scenario. Chapter 4 suggests that the government should use
Total Net Present Value (TNPV), which includes option value, in evaluating projects.
The valuation of TNPV not only implies that it is more correct than the simple NPV
valuation, but also that the government can increase the value of its projects by applying
DSP that takes into account uncertainties and risks and insures managerial flexibility.
This chapter analyzes policy issues in implementing Dynamic Strategic Planning
(DSP). The application of DSP to projects has two expected results. First, the initiation
of an investment that has almost zero NPV based on the conventional valuation becomes
easier. Second, the initiation of a large-scale investment becomes more difficult. There
are stakeholders who favor or oppose each result. In order to use the positive properties
of DSP effectively while alleviating any negative impact on stakeholders, this chapter
recommends that Japan's Ministry of Transportation (MOT) use DSP as a basis while the
Ministry considers political issues (Figure 5-1).
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Figure 5-1: Diagram of policy analysis for implementing Dynamic Strategic
Planning in Japan's Ministry of Transportation
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2. Flexibility insured
1. More correct valuation
2. Maximize Total NPV
3. Increase real value of project_
DSP instead of
conventional method
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82
Problem definition: Conventional cost-benefit analysis alone cannot ensure optimal
investment decision-making
As Chapter 1 indicates, investment by the Japanese government is required to be
more efficient today than it used to be. For the past half-century, the Japanese
government has almost continually invested in the nation's transportation infrastructure
under the assumption that demand for it will increase rapidly. This situation, however,
has changed. The economic growth of Japan in 1999 is not as strong as it used to be.
The public sector is suffering from a huge budget deficit. Under such circumstances,
some public works are being criticized as inefficient.
In March 1997, MOT announced that it would introduce cost-benefit analysis for
its major new investments. The Ministry checks whether the Cost-Benefit Ratio of a
major new project exceeds one and also evaluates the NPV of the project. While the
incorporation of cost-benefit analysis into MOT's decision-making process represents
progress, it could be dangerous if it is not used appropriately from a political perspective
as well as from the standpoint of evaluation methodology.
First, in the real world in which there are many uncertainties and risks, cost-
benefit analysis based on an a priori deterministic scenario can lead decision-makers to
incorrect conclusions because this process does not reflect factors that significantly affect
NPV. Also, current conventional cost-benefit analysis fails to capture the value of Real
Options.
Second, if cost-benefit analysis were strictly applied to government's investment
decision criteria, the results would be unfavorable to investments in the rural areas. The
demand for transportation infrastructure in the countryside is less than that in
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metropolitan areas. For example, while the development of a container berth in the
countryside costs almost same as it does in a metropolitan area, it does not accrue as
much benefit. Accordingly, while it is often easy to see a Cost-Benefit Ratio of more
than one in metropolitan areas, it is sometimes difficult to do so in a rural district.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of distribution equity, which is one of government's
most significant functions, this alone should not justify government investment in
metropolitan areas to the exclusion of the countryside.
Thus, conventional cost-benefit analysis is not necessarily the best instrument to
use as one of the criteria for determining investment. It needs to be improved.
Policy instruments: DSP
A desirable policy instrument alternative to conventional cost-benefit analysis
must overcome its disadvantages. At the same time, it must, of course, ensure investment
efficiency.
While it may be necessary to deal separately with the two fundamental efficiency
and political issues identified above, DSP, which takes Real Options value into account,
can deal with both. First, DSP-based valuation is more correct from the point of view of
project valuation methodology, and decisions using DSP increase the efficiency of an
investment. Investment efficiency should be the basis for any government decision on a
project, even though this sometimes might be politically difficult. Otherwise, the
government might just waste money even when using cost-benefit analysis is politically
acceptable.
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Second, as the case study shows, the TNPV including Real Options value using
DSP is greater than the Base Expected NPV. This facilitates investment in the
countryside. Here, it should be noted that it is important for the area to have a strategic
development plan because this gives value to an expansion option.
This thesis, therefore, argues that DSP is the method that MOT should incorporate
into its decision criteria for transportation infrastructure investment instead of
conventional cost-benefit analysis.
Cast of characters: Stakeholders, decision-makers, and influence brokers
Before analyzing the cast of characters, the impact of the application of DSP to
projects should be clear. It seems to have two major properties. First, the initiation of an
investment that has almost zero NPV based on the conventional valuation becomes more
feasible because DSP-based NPV captures the value of Real Options in projects. Second,
the initiation of a large-scale investment might become more difficult because it might be
risky when there are significant uncertainties in cost or demand.
Stakeholders
There are stakeholders who favor or oppose each property. Three major
stakeholder groups can be identified: opinion leaders/the general public, local
governments/industry, and an authority of financial appropriation (Table 5-1).
First of all, opinion leaders and the general public are concerned about the
wasteful use of their taxes. In Japan, they are the fundamental driving force pressuring
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the national government to make its investments more efficient. Thus, they must be in
favor of DSP because it ensures optimal tax use. (Attention, however, should be paid to
the fact that the Environment Agency and other groups who are particularly conscious
about the environment might not welcome the first property of DSP, the facilitation of
investment.)
Second, because significant portions of the construction costs of major
transportation infrastructure are borne by the national government in Japan, local
governments, in particular those in countryside, are against the second property of DSP
while they are in favor of the first. Public infrastructure is one of basic factors for a
region to acquire competitive advantages over other regions [Porter 1990]. Thus, local
governments may want a larger-scale infrastructure for the future development of the
region. (This is also true for the national government to acquire competitive advantages
over other nations.) The stake of industry may be the same as that of local government
because it wants as many business opportunities as possible. These are political issues
related to distribution equity.
Third, the financial authority, here the Ministry of Finance (MOF), has two faces.
First, it is the ultimate entity responsible for the effective use of taxpayer's money.
Particularly now that the Japanese government is suffering from a huge deficit, MOF is
also the driver pressuring each branch of the government to reduce expenditures. In this
sense, the position of MOF is the same as that of opinion leaders/the general public.
On the other hand, MOF is also concerned about overall economic conditions
throughout Japan. Public works are sometimes used as a tool to stimulate economic
activities mainly based on the Keynesian notion of effective demand [Blanchard 1997].
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The private sector and its employees often welcome this policy. MOF sometimes must
launch economic stimulus packages in spite of its responsibility to reduce the deficit. In
this sense, the position of MOF is the same as that of local governments/industry.
Decision-makers
The decision-makers on this issue are MOT officials. Attention should be paid to
the fact that MOT is not only the decision-maker, but also a stakeholder. Local
governments, as well as branches of the national government, such as MOT and the
Ministry of Construction (MOC), are the developers and supporters of public
infrastructure projects. They usually try to obtain as large a budget as possible from the
financial authorities, MOF. Complex mechanisms work behind this tendency. Under
such circumstances, individual government sectors often work as delegates of different
interest groups [Lowi 1979].
Influence brokers
Two major influence brokers are the economists and the politicians. Economists
are supposed to support scientific decision-making by the government from the
economics perspective. Accordingly, they should support DSP.
On the other hand, the positions of politicians are diverse. They represent various
groups of stakeholders, and their influence as regional representatives seems to be quite
strong. Consequently, they tend to be conscious of distribution equity, and may take the
same position as that of local governments/industry.
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Constituency and impediments
To sum up the above discussion, most stakeholders, except the environmentalists,
generally favor the first property of the application of DSP. On the other hand, MOT
must reconcile the conflicts arising from the second property.
Implementation strategy
Definition of Strategy and Tactical Plan
The key to the successful application of DSP is using its positive properties
effectively, while alleviating any negative impact on stakeholders. The tactical plan to
implement DSP has two steps. First, MOT should focus totally on DSP because its
approach maximizes the NPV of a project and a DSP-based valuation is more correct
than the conventional cost-benefit valuation is. This total focus of the DSP solves the
problem of investment efficiency.
However, a second step is necessary because, if DSP is strictly applied to all
projects, it becomes more difficult to initiate investment in a large-scale facility even
when such an investment is politically desirable. To overcome this disadvantage of DSP,
particularly to local governments/industry, and hence to MOT also, this thesis
recommends that MOT allow a larger-scale investment if the investment has a positive
NPV and is politically desirable. This possibility may solve the political issue.
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Evaluation of Impediments
This section defines three alternative measures for making MOT's investment
efficient for the purpose of comparison:
1. Simple NPV (current system): Investment decisions are made on the basis of a
deterministic scenario.
2. Strict DSP: Investment decisions are made using only DSP so as to maximize
the TNPV of a project.
3. Quasi DSP: Investment decisions are based initially on DSP. However, a
larger-scale initial investment is also acceptable, as long as its TNPV is
positive and its political implications are identified.
Table 5-2 evaluates reactions to the three alternative measures of each stakeholder
group. First of all, for opinion leaders and the general public, each of the alternatives
would be acceptable because all of them are designed to ensure investment efficiency.
Alternative 1 might be less attractive because its valuation will be less correct than the
others. Those who are particularly conscious about the environment might be
unfavorable to Alternative 3. (This issue is discussed in the Negotiations section.)
Second, for local governments/industry, Alternative 1 is not attractive because it
is inherently unfavorable to investments in the countryside. Although Alternative 2 saves
projects whose NPVs are close to zero on the basis of Alternative 1, the smaller
investment resulting from strict DSP is unattractive to local governments/industry.
Alternative 3 can solve this problem for them.
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Third, while the position of MOF depends on economic conditions in Japan, all
alternatives are acceptable because they all ensure investment efficiency. (Alternative 1
might be less attractive because its valuation will be less correct than the others.)
Finally, the reaction of MOT as a stakeholder will be basically the same as those
of local governments/industry now that all alternatives seek investment efficiency. MOT
might prefer Alternative 1 because this measure is rather simple if the Ministry is able to
set a deterministic scenario arbitrarily. However, MOT should notice that the more
arbitrary the scenario is, the more difficult it is for MOT to justify it.
In sum, Alternative 3 is acceptable for all stakeholders because, even though
quantified NPV is not necessarily maximized, it ensures the investment efficiency.
Negotiations
Significant negotiation counterparts are the Environment Agency, local
governments and their supporters, and MOF. First, to deal with the concern about DSP's
impact on the environment, cost-benefit analysis should be developed in conjunction with
the Environment Agency. If NPV reflects the social cost and benefit including the
environmental impact, the decision based on it should be rational for the Agency, too.
(Transportation infrastructure investments often have positive environment effects.) It
should also be noted that the current environmental assessment procedures in
constructing major transportation infrastructure remain even if DSP is applied. Thus, the
environmental protection groups can ensure the prevention of environmental
deterioration.
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Table 5-1: Stakeholders and their powers
Stakeholders Powers Initiatives
Opinion leader/ Formation of public opinion Pressuring governments
General public
Environment authorities Authorizing environment Environment protection
assessment activities
Local government/ Governing citizens Demanding budget (by way
Industry of politicians, sometimes)
Ministry of Finance Budget allocation/ Pressuring each branch
appropriation
Ministry of Transportation Making decision Policy implementation
Table 5-2: Stakeholders and their reactions to alternative measures
Stakeholders Reactions
Alternative 1: Alternative 2: Alternative 3:
Simple NPV Strict DSP use Quasi DSP
Opinion leader/ Welcome (Could 1. Attractive Acceptable
General public be less attractive) 2. Attractive
Environment authorities (Acceptable) (1. Unattractive) Acceptable
(2. Attractive)
Local government/ Not welcome 1. Attractive Attractive
Industry 2. Unattractive
Ministry of Finance (Could be less Depends (Attractive)
attractive)
Ministry of Transportation Depends (Could 1. Attractive Attractive
be attractive) 2. Unattractive
1. Initial investment is facilitated.
2. Initial investment becomes smaller.
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Second, to deal with the political issue resulting from DSP (the second property),
the standard of the circumstances under which a larger-scale investment is allowed
should be set in conjunction with local governments and their supporters (politicians
etc.). The threshold for investment in rural areas should be lowered. Also, discussing the
method of weighting benefits in the countryside with the local governments and related
stakeholders may be useful.
Third, because MOF is the ultimate authority in authorizing the budget of
development, negotiations above should be proceeded in conjunction with MOF.
Regulation/Legislation
The advantage of this proposal is that the incorporation of (quasi) DSP is the
application of the current systems; thus no special legislation is required. The decision as
to whether to use it would be made internally by MOT. From the perspective of
accountability to the public regarding this policy, MOT should be the agency responsible
for guidance in implementing (quasi) DSP.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis shows that it is beneficial for the Japan's Ministry of Transportation
(MOT) to incorporate Dynamic Strategic Planning (DSP) into its decision-making in
investing transportation infrastructure projects. A case study of a container terminal
development in Japan demonstrates that the project valuation based on DSP is more
precise than the conventional method and that DSP has advantages over the conventional
method in terms of its ability to increase the real value of projects.
Chapter 1 first introduces criticisms of inefficient infrastructure investments in
Japan both at macro and project levels. It then overviews Japanese transportation
infrastructure development systems that might affect investment efficiency, such as
inflexible investment five-year plans, and so on. This chapter finally introduces efforts
towards more efficient investments, such as the incorporation of cost-benefit analysis into
investment decision criteria.
Chapter 2 first demonstrates that forecasts are never perfect in the real world. It
then introduces uncertainties and risks faced by the transportation infrastructure using a
dichotomy: market uncertainties and project uncertainties.
Chapter 3 presents the concept and advantages of DSP using the example of an
airport investment. This arbitrarily created simple example explains the concept of DSP
and the fact that it takes into account future uncertainties and risks and insures managerial
flexibility. It also explains advantages of DSP as well as the defects of Net Present Value
(NPV) based on a deterministic scenario (the simple NPV based on conventional cost-
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benefit analysis). This chapter finally introduces major methods to include projects' Real
Options value: decision tree analysis, the Black-Scholes equation, and Monte-Carlo
simulation.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to a case study in which a container terminal development
in Japan is evaluated by proposing the DSP approach based on the cost-benefit analysis
framework. The case study demonstrates that the project valuation based on DSP using
decision tree analysis, the Black-Scholes equation, or Monte-Carlo simulation, is more
precise than the conventional method. This chapter also explains that DSP has
advantages over the conventional method in terms of its ability to increase the real value
of projects.
Chapter 5 analyzes policy issues in implementing DSP. There are two properties
of the application of DSP to projects. First, the initiation of investment that has almost
zero NPV based on the conventional valuation becomes easier. Second, the initiation of
large-scale investment becomes more difficult. There are stakeholders who favor or
oppose each property. In order to use preferable properties of DSP effectively while
alleviating negative impacts on stakeholders, this chapter recommends that MOT use
quasi DSP considering political issues.
It is beneficial for Japan's MOT to incorporate DSP into its decision criteria in
investing transportation infrastructure projects instead of conventional cost-benefit
analysis, thus the thesis recommends that MOT use DSP as a basis for project evaluation.
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Appendix 1: Cost-Benefit Model
1. Global variables
(1) Discount Rate (for the simple NPV and decision analysis): 4% (the rate that MOT
applies based on several interest rates in public loan).
(2) Capacity of each berth: -10m = 600,000 ton/year, -14m = 1,000,000 ton/year
(Because there is no official standard regarding this in Japan, they are assumed as
being two-thirds of the average ton/(berth length) in the port of Kobe, the largest port
in Japan, in 1994 (before the earthquake). Two-thirds is the ratio of the number of
cranes per total berth lengths in Port A to that in the port of Kobe.)
2. Cost Model
(1) Construction Cost: This is basically based on actual data obtained from the port
authority of Port A. Common costs are allocated to each berth using the ratio of berth
lengths (-10m berth = 170m, -14m berth = 280m). However, as each berth has a
same type of crane, the crane costs are allocated equally. Construction cost and
period of undeveloped -14m berth are assumed as being the same as those of the
developed -14m berth.
(2) Operation Cost: Y (1,000 Yen) = 176,705 * X (1,000 ton)0.32895726
This formula is created here so as to reflect the economy of scale in terminal
operation. The coefficients are determined by regression using data on container
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volume and operation cost obtained from a major terminal operating company in
Japan (R2 = 0.50).
Table Al-1: Container Terminal Operation Cost
Year Container Handling Operation cost
(1,000 ton) (1,000 Yen)
1 21,761 4,562,471
2 22,532 4,915,588
3 28,539 5,004,529
4 25,321 4,912,941
5 26,334 5,271,353
Note: Data are acquired on anonymous basis from a terminal operation company in Japan.
Operation cost here is assumed as being the total expense of the company multiplied by the
ratio of the number of container terminals to total the company operates.
3. Benefit Model
(1) Framework of Benefit Model
Figure Al-1: Framework of Benefit Model
With Port A Without Port A
The other ports
Potential hinterland of Port A
Port A
Short delivery
-> Savings of transportation costs (including time value of cargoes) for the potential
hinterland of Port A represent the benefit of developing Port A. (No induced
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cargo demand because of the development of Port A is assumed, i.e., there is no
demand curve transition in the case with Port A with respect to the case without
Port A.)
(2) Potential hinterland of Port A: The area where Port A is most advantageous for users
in terms of access cost and time (The prefecture B).
(3) Alternative ports without Port A: The shares of each port that handled cargoes
originated in and destined for the prefecture B in 1993 are assumed to be constant for
the future if Port A had not been developed. (Four major port areas handled the
container cargoes originated in and destined for the prefecture B.) [Japan, Ministry of
Transportation, 1994]
(4) Transportation cost: The transportation route between the prefecture B and each port
area is assumed as the shortest route in terms of time. Then, transportation cost is
calculated based on tariff data [Kotsu Nihon Sha 1997 and Zenkoku Kosoku Doro
Kensetsu Kyogikai 1998]. One TEU (Twenty-feet-container Equivalent Unit) is
converted into 18.7 ton based on an interview to Japan's Ministry of Transportation
(MOT) [1999b].
(5) Transportation time value: The average speeds on roads are assumed as the average
of overall Japan based on data in Road Transportation Census, [Japan, Ministry of
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Construction 1995]. Time value of container cargoes is based on an interview to
MOT [1999b].
(6) Salvage Value: Salvage value of the terminal should be added at the end of the final
year of the valuation period. Among the facilities developed, the value of land, crane,
and warehouse are taken into account because they are likely to have market value if
the operation of Port A is abandoned. (Berth and anchorage are not likely to have
market value when the project is abandoned because they are very specific in terms of
both objective and location.)
e Land: Development cost is used as the salvage value. Although the salvage value
of land should be the market value if it is sold, the development cost is assumed
as being a good approximation because sufficient information on its future market
value is not available.
* Crane: The formula, P = 0.9 * C *(1 - t/17), is applied to its salvage value (P =
salvage value; C = development cost; t = duration of usage; 17 = the depreciation
period of a crane [Japan, Ministry of Finance 1995a and 1995b]). The salvage
value after 17 years (0.1* C) is assumed to be canceled off with its removal cost.
* Warehouse: The same valuation as crane is applied except that warehouse has 45
years of depreciation periods instead of 17years [Japan, Ministry of Finance
1995a and 1995b].
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Table A1-2: Global Variables for simple NPV calculation
indicates input data
(The other cells are calculated.)
Discount rate 4%
Capacity (1,000 ton/yr)
-1On Berth 600
- 14m Berth 1,000
National market growth rate 5.9%
Share in hinterland
1st 5yr of operation (yr 6-10) 7.1%
After yr 10 (increase %/yr) 2.4%
Potential hinterland demand at yr 0 (1,000 ton) 482
Potential hinterland demand
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Demand (1,000 ton) 510 541 572 606 642 680 720 762 807 855 906 959 1016 1075 1139 1206 1277 13531 14321 1517
Year 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Demand (1,000 ton) 1606 1701 1802 1908 2020 2140 2266 2400 2541 2691 2850 3018 3196 3385 3584
Deterministic Demand Scenario
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Demand (1,000 ton) - - - - 49 51 54 58 61 86 114 146 180 218 2601 3061 3561 412t 4721
Year 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Demand (1,000 ton) 539 611 691 777 872 974 1086 1208 1340 1484 1640 1809 1992 2191 2406
0
Table A1-3: Cost Model
Construction (1,000 Yen)
Year 1 2 3 4 5 Total
-10m Berth 34,475 749,600 701,375 1,731,675 1,362,625 4,579,750
Berth 26,600 453,000 384,000 121,200 70,000 1,054,800
Anchorage 145,600 67,000 2,100 214,700
Allocation 7,875 151,000 250,375 1,608,375 1,292,625 3,310,250
Land 7,875 139,500 102,375 795,375 562,500 1,607,625
Crane 11,500 148,000 813,000 220,500 1,193,000
Warehouse 59,625 59,625
Miscellaneous 450,000 450,000
-14m Berth 82,125 1,185,600 1,804,325 3,926,625 2,859,575 9,858,250
Berth 69,000 862,000 805,900 449,600 183,000 2,369,500
Anchorage 79,600 679,800 1,338,400 669,200 2,767,000
Allocation 13,125 244,000 318,625 2,138,625 2,007,375 4,721,750
Land 13,125 232,500 170,625 1,325,625 937,500 2,679,375
Crane 11,500 148,000 813,000 220,500 1,193,000
Warehouse 99,375 99,375
Miscellaneous 750,000 750,000
Total 116,600 1,935,200 2,505,700 5,658,300 4,222,200 14,438,000
-1Oin, -14m Common (Before Allocation)
Land 21,000 372,000 273,000 2,121,000 1,500,000 4,287,000
Crane 23,000 296,000 1,626,000 441,000 2,386,000
Warehouse 159,000 159,000
Miscellaneous 1,200,000 1,200,000
Subtotal 21,000 395,000 569,000 3,747,000 3,300,000 8,032,000
Total 116,600 1,935,200 2,505,700 5,658,300 4,222,200 14,438,000
Italic: Original Data
Regular: Assumption
Operation Cost (1,000 Yen)= 176,705 * (1,000 ton) A 0.3289573
Table A1-4: Benefit Model
1 TEU (t) 18.7
HWY speed (km/h) 66 .5
Standard road speed (km/h) 33 5
Time Value (Y1000/TEU/h) 1.5
Without Port A
Handling Port Area Distance (km) HWY (kn) Standard Road (km) Tariff (Y1OOO/TEU) Toll (Y1000/TEU) Cost (Y1000/ton) TR time (h) Time Value (Y1000/t)
B 197 18 179 80.1 1.37 4.36 5.61 0.45
C 700 563 137 165.39 38.24 10.89 12.56 1.01
D 895 751 144 192 50.96 12.99 15.59 1.25
E 1,240 1,077 163 238.55 73.01 16.66 21.06 1.69
Handling Port Area Handling (t/mon.) Share(%) Cost (YI 000/t) Time Value (YIOOO/t)
B 25,969 71.57% 3.118141982 0.322307955
C 9,645 26.58% 2.894627561 0.267725807
D 32 0.09% 0.011458593 0.001103039
E 637 1.76% 0.292506154 0.029659798
Total 36,283 100.00% 6.31673429 0.6207966
With Port A
Handling Port Distance (km) HWY (km) Standard Road (km) ITariff (Y1000/TEU) Toll (Y IOOO/TEU)I Cost (Y 1000/t) ITR time (h)ITime Value (YOOO/t)
A 21 18 3 24.581 137 1.39 0.36 0.03
Net Saving
Cost (Y 1000/t) 4.93
Time Value (YI000/t) 0.59
Salvage Value (Depreciation Method)
Salvage Value ratio Period (yr)
Land 1 N.A.
Crane 0.1 17
Warehouse 0.1 45
0C.,'
Table A1-5: Actual Investment (Start building -10m & -14m Berths at year 1, and no additional investment.)
Discount rate 4%
Demand Scenario Deterministic
NPV at the year 0 (1,000 Yen) 10,185,422
Unit: 1,000 Yen
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Cost component
Construction cost 116,600 1,935,200 2,505,700 5,658,300 4,222,200
Operation cost 633,595 645,656 657,947 670,472 683,235 765,921 840,325
Total Cost 116,600 1,935,200 2,505,700 5,658,300 4,222,200 633,595 645,656 657,947 670,472 683,235 765,921 840,325
Benefit component
TR cost saving 239,109 253,216 268,156 283,977 300,732 425,599 564,153
Time saving 28,713 30,407 32,201 34,100 36,112 51,107 67,744
Salvage value
Land
Crane
Warehouse
Total Benefit 0 0 0 0 0 267,821 283,623 300,357 318,078 336,844 476,705 631,898
Net Benefit -116,600 -1,935,200 -2,505,700 -5,658,300 -4,222,200 -365,773 -362,033 -357,591 -352,394 -346,391 -289,216 -208,427
PV of Net Benefit -112,115 -1,789,201 -2,227,558 -4,836,739 -3,470,341 -289,076 -275,116 -261,288 -247,588 -234,010 -187,869 -130,183
Cumulative PV -112,115 -1,901,317 -4,128,875 -8,965,613 -12,435,954 -12,725,030 -13,000,145 -13,261,433 -13,509,021 -13,743,031 -13,930,900 -14,061,083
Year 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Cost component
Construction cost 23,000 296,000 1,626,000 441,000
Operation cost 909,523 975,256 1,038,614 1,100,335 1,160,940 1,220,819 1,280,268 1,339,525 1,398,779 1,458,189 1,517,889 1,577,993
Total Cost 909,523 975,256 1,038,614 1,100,335 1,160,940 1,220,819 1,303,268 1,635,525 3,024,779 1,899,189 1,517,889 1,577,993
Benefit component
TR cost saving 717,576 887,138 1,074,212 1,280,271 1,506,906 1,755,828 2,028,877 2,328,033 2,655,427 3,013,350 3,404,265 3,830,818
Time saving 86,168 106,529 128,993 153,737 180,952 210,843 243,631 279,554 318,868 361,848 408,790 460,011
Salvage value
Land
Crane
Warehouse
Total Benefit 803,744 993,668 1,203,205 1,434,008 1,687,858 1,966,670 2,272,507 2,607,587 2,974,296 3,375,199 3,813,055 4,290,829
Net Benefit -105,780 18,412 164,590 333,673 526,918 745,852 969,239 972,062 -50,484 1,476,009 2,295,166 2,712,836
PV of Net Benefit -63,528 10,632 91,391 178,151 270,506 368,173 460,042 443,636 -22,154 622,810 931,209 1,058,335
Cumulative PV -14,124,611 -14,113,979 -14,022,588 -13,844,437 -13,573,931 -13,205,758 -12,745,716 -12,302,079 -12,324,233 -11,701,423 -10,770,214 -9,711,879
Ca
Year 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Cost component
Construction cost
Operation cost 1,638,601 1,699,803 1,761,678 1,824,298 1,887,730 1,952,036 2,001,089 2,001,089 2,001,089 2,001,089 2,001,089
Total Cost 1,638,601 1,699,803 1,761,678 1,824,298 1,887,730 1,952,036 2,001,089 2,001,089 2,001,089 2,001,089 2,001,089
Benefit component
TR cost saving 4,295,854 4,802,429 5,353,826 5,953,570 6,605,448 7,313,523 7,886,651 7,886,651 7,886,651 7,886,651 7,886,651
Time saving 515,853 576,684 642,896 714,914 793,193 878,220 947,042 947,042 947,042 947,042 947,042
Salvage value 4,839,971
Land 4,287,000
Crane 505,271
Warehouse 47,700
Total Benefit 4,811,707 5,379,112 5,996,722 6,668,485 7,398,641 8,191,743 8,833,693 8,833,693 8,833,693 8,833,693 13,673,663
Net Benefit 3,173,106 3,679,309 4,235,044 4,844,187 5,510,911 6,239,707 6,832,604 6,832,604 6,832,604 6,832,604 11,672,574
PV of Net Benefit 1,190,285 1,327,087 1,468,783 1,615,427 1,767,081 1,923,818 2,025,595 1,947,688 1,872,777 1,800,747 2,958,011
Cumulative PV -8,521,593 -7,194,506 -5,725,723 -4,110,295 -2,343,214 -419,396 1,606,200 3,553,888 5,426,664 7,227,411 10,185,422
0
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Appendix 2: Statistics Regarding Uncertainties
1. Construction costs
Using data shown in Table 2-7 and assuming that the ratio of actual to estimated
cost is lognormally distributed, the Bracket-Median method gives three discrete
percentages of actual cost to estimated cost with equal probability as follows [Neely
1998]. (The original data obtained are assumed as being for a medium-cost case.)
Table A2-1: Actual and Estimated Cost of Container Terminal Construction
in Japan and its distribution (Cost Unit: 108 Yen)
Seaport Terminal A. Actual B. Estimate C. A/B(%) ~ LND D. ln(C) ~ ND
Y 1 142 149 95 4.55
2 136 150 91 4.51
K 1 170 147 116 4.75
2 243 179 136 4.91
Source: Japan, Ministry of Transportation (1999a)
Note: LND = Lognormal distribution; ND = Normal distribution
Statistics about associated ND D
Mean (p) 4.68
Standard Deviation (a) 0.19
Table A2-2: Three discrete costs by the Bracket-Median method
Case Probability D C. exp(D) (%) Note
High 0.33 4.86 129 D = p + 0.975*a
Medium 0.33 4.68 108 D = p
Low 0.33 4.50 90 D = p - 0.975*a
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2. Market demand
The latest ten year data on container cargo throughout Japan show an average
annual growth rate of 5.9% with the standard deviation of 2.4%/year growth rate.
Assuming that the ratio of the annual growth rate is normally distributed, the Bracket-
Median method gives three discrete annual growth rates as follows.
Table A2-3: National container cargo volume
Year 10,000 ton ratio ~ ND
1988 9,993
1989 10,731 1.074
19901 11,528 1.074
1991 12,493 1.084
1992 12,974 1.039
1993 13,480 1.039
1994 14,747 1.094
1995 15,597 1.058
1996 16,468 1.056
1997 16,798 1.020
Source: Nihon Kowan Kyokai (1998)
'88-'97 annual growth rate (p) 1.059
Standard deviation of ratio (T) 0.024
Table A2-4: Three discrete market growths by the Bracket-Median method
Case Probability Annual growth rate (R) Note
High 0.33 1.083 R = p + 0.975*0
Medium 0.33 1.059 R =p
Low 0.33 1.036 R = - 0.975*0
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3. Project share
(1) Base share (first five years of operation)
N seaport and H seaport, which are similar to A seaport in terms of scales of
seaport facilities and hinterland population, are analyzed. During the first five years of
container-handling, the average share captured by each seaport in each potential
hinterland does not show a strong time-series tendency. (R2 of simple time series
regression (Share = a + b* Year ) is only 0.17, and t-statistic of the coefficient for the
variable Year, b, is only 0.78.) Assuming that the share acquired by seaport A for the
first five years of operation is just lognormally distributed, data on seaports N and H give
-2.64 on average with 0.9 standard deviation for the associated normal distribution base.
Three discrete shares are given by the Bracket-Median method.
It should be noted that there is no data as to time-series data for the share of each
seaport in its hinterland actually. Share in each year is calculated assuming that each
seaport's hinterland is the prefecture at which it is located and the share of each
prefecture's cargo to the nation is the same as data in 1994
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Table A2-5: Project share during the first five years of operation
Year Average Port N ~ LND Port H ~ LND Ln(N) ~ ND ln(H) ~ ND
1 0.092 0.024 0.159 -3.72 -1.84
2 0.107 0.024 0.190 -3.74 -1.66
3 0.085 0.032 0.138 -3.44 -1.98
4 0.085 0.041 0.130 -3.20 -2.04
5 0.124 0.041 0.208 -3.21 -1.57
Source: Japan, Ministry of Transportation
Note: LND = Lognormal distribution; ND
(1994 and
= Normal
1999a)
distribution
Statistics Share ln(Share)
Mean (p) 0.099 -2.64
Standard Deviation ((7) 0.074 0.89
Table A2-6: Three discrete shares (first
by the Bracket-Median method
5-yr. operations)
Case Probability Share ln(Share) Note
High 0.33 0.171 -1.77 ln(Share) = p.+ 0.975*a
Medium 0.33 0.071 -2.64 ln(Share) = p
Low 0.33 0.030 -3.51 ln(Share) = p.- 0.975*a
(2) Annual incremental share (after five years of operation)
After five years of operation, the average share captured by each seaport in each
potential hinterland shows an incremental time-series tendency starting from the base
share, the first five year average (9.9%). R2 of simple time series regression (Share =
0.99 + 0.024* Year ) is 0.81, and t-statistic of the coefficient for the variable Year, 0.024
is 12. Thus, the share captured by seaport A is expected to increase by 2.4%/year on
average after the first five years of operation.
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The same time-series regression on seaport N gives the coefficient of 0.028 for
the variable Year, while that on seaport H gives 0.020. These two data of seaport N and
seaport H constitute 0.005 standard deviation of the annual incremental share. Three
discrete shares are given by the Bracket-Median method.
Table A2-7: Project share after the first
five years of operation
Year Average Port N Port H
5 yr. average 0.099 0.032 0.165
6 0.158 0.038 0.279
7 0.140 0.052 0.227
8 0.157 0.113 0.200
9 0.181 0.152 0.210
10 0.222 0.202 0.241
11 0.253 0.181 0.324
Source: Japan, Ministry of Transportation (1994 and 1999a)
Table A2-8: Annual additional share after the first five years of operation (- ND)
Year N seaport H seaport
After 5 yr. 0.028 0.020
Mean (g) 0.024
Standard Deviation (a) 0.005
Table A2-9: Three discrete additional shares (after 5-yr. operations)
by the Bracket-Median method
Case Probability Additional share(%/yr.) Note
High 0.33 0.029 Increase = g + 0.975*a
Medium 0.33 0.024 Increase = p
Low 0.33 0.019 Increase = p - 0.975*a
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Appendix 3: Decision Tree Analysis for Case Study
1. Demand scenario during the first five years of operation
Using the results shown in Appendix 2, three discrete outcomes of market growth
rates (high: 8.3%/yr; medium: 5.9%/yr; low: 3.6%/yr) and three discrete outcomes of
base project shares (high: 17.1%; medium: 7.1%; low: 3.0%) yield nine demand growth
paths. Assuming that the distribution of nine demands for each year is lognormally
distributed, the Bracket-Median method gives three discrete demands for each year.
Thus, three demand growth paths for the first five years of operation are defined (HI,
Mi, LI) so that the Excel treeplan can be used.
2. Demand scenario after the first five years of operation
For each one of three demand growth paths in the first five years of operation
(H1, MI, Li), the same procedure as described above is used in order to obtain three
demand growth paths for the period after the first five years of operation. As a result,
nine demand growth paths are used in the decision tree analysis (H1H2, HIM2, HiL2;
M1H2', MIM2', M1L2'; LIH2", LIM2", LIL2").
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Table A3-1: Nine demand growth paths
First 5 yrs. of operation After 5 yrs. of operation
H2
HI M2
L2
H2'
M1 M2'
L2'
H2"
LI M2"
L2"
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Figure A3-1: Decision tree for case study (NPV Unit: million Yen)
Initial Decision Construction Cost Phase 1 Demand Second Decision Phase 2 Demand Pay Off
(Yr 0) (Yr 10) 0.33
High
16,258
16,258 16,258
0.33
1. Same Medium
11,476
10,890 11,476 11,476
0.33
Low
4,935
4,935 4,935
0.33
High
29,130
29,130 29,130
0.33 0.33
High 2. Add -14m Medium
15,989
15,372 15,131 15,989 15,989
0.33
Low
275
275 275
0.33
High
33,703
33,703 33,703
0.33
3. Add -10m & -14m Medium
14,984
15,37214,8 14,984 14,984
0.33
Low
-2,571
-2,571 -2,571
0.33
High
11,436
11,436 11,436
0.33
1. Same Medium
6,557
6,008 6,557 6,557
0.33
Low
30
21,107
117
2. Add -14m
7,891
0.33
Medium
7,891
-5,637
0.33
-5,637
High
7,274
-8,483
0.33
-8,483
High
1. Same
-1,882
0.33
-1,882
High
2. Add -14m
4,989 4,989
-7,815
0.33
8,202
-5,637
24,194
6,111
-8,483
10,811
4,583
-1,882
17,771
5,012
-7,815
-7,815
High
20,185
2,527
4,017
-10,661
-10,661 -10,661
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0.33
High
0.33
Medium
17,864
13,081
6,541
31,741
18,600
2,886
36,778
18,058
503
13,042
8,163
1,636
23,718
10,813
119
12,078
-3,026
27,269
9,186
-5,408
12,417
6,189
-277
20,383
7,623
-5,204
23,260
5,601
-7,587
High
-7,587 -7,587
0.33
120
12,183
19,240
14,458
7,917
33,979
20,839
5,124
39,413
20,694
3,138
14,419
9,540
3,012
25,957
13,051
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-787
1 29,904
29,904 29,9041 2,0
0.33
3. Add -10m & -14m Medium
11,821
12,984+11,821 11,821
0.33
Low
-2,773
-2,773 -2,773
0.33
High
13,793
13,793 13,793
0.33
1. Same Medium
7,566
7,486 7,566 7,566
44- 0.33
12,078 Low
1,100
1,100 1,100
0.33
High
22,621
,22,621 22,621
0.33 0.33
Low 2. Add -14m Medium
9,861
9,839 9,839 9,861 9,861
0.33
Low
-2,966
-2,966 -2,966
0.33
High
25,895
25,895 25,895
0.33
3. Add -10m & -14m Medium
8,236
9,727 8,236 8,236
0.33
Low
-4,951
-4,951 
-4,951
0.33
High
24,079
24,079 24,079
122
14,444
1,651
31,775
13,293
-4,499
17,255
7,649
-4,260
22,266
4,183
-10,411
14,379
4,880
-6,438
123
4,274
High
2,089
-12,589
0.33
High
1. Same
4,059
0.33
High
16,911
-1,111
0.33
High
1. Same
9,289
-1,852
0.339,289
High
124
-12,589
0.33
High 4,059
18,257
599
-12,589
26,487
16,851
4,059
35,163
16,681
-1,111
19,663
10,057
-1,852
25,654
7,572
-1,111
0.33
10,862
0.33
10,961
-1,852
0.33
8,735 7,572 7,572
0.33
Low
-7,022 -7,022
0.33
High
1. Same
-4,031
0.33
-4,031
High
5,477
High
-9,201 -9,201
0.33
1. Same
0.33
High
High
6,123
0.33
6,123
19,815
1,793
0.33
-7,022
16,787
7,288
-4,031
21,645
3,987
-9,201
28,551
18,915
6,123
38,068
19,585
1,793
1,793
High
125
6,682
-6,297 -6,297
21,727
12,121
212
28,559
10,476
-4,118
18,851
9,352
-1,967
24,550
6,891
-6,297
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Appendix 4: Monte-Carlo simulation for Case Study
1. Base Expected NPV
Using the statistical information (distribution, mean, and standard deviation)
introduced in Appendix 2, Monte-Carlo simulation first generates ten realizations of
demand growth paths. The average NPV of the ten realizations for the Phase 1
investment gives a Base Expected NPV for the Phase 1 facilities. (Here, the Phase 2
decision is not taken into account.)
2. Option value
For each one of above ten realizations, ten further realizations of demand growth
paths are generated for the period after Year 11 (thus resulting in 100 realizations of
project demand growth paths after the Phase 2 decision). The option value is realized
when the expected value of expansion, given information on Phase 1, is greater than the
expected value of non-expansion. The option value arises by resolutions of demand
uncertainty and cost uncertainty. (Because market demand uncertainty is never resolved,
it has nothing to do with option value here. All option value coming from the resolution
of demand uncertainty is attributed to the resolution of the project share uncertainty.)
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Table A4-1: Generated Project demand by Monte-Carlo Simulation (Unit: 1,000 ton)
Demand for Base NPV
Year 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Demand 1 131 143 146 154 157 185 218 252 289 332 392 443 510 563 655 731 798 890 932 1033 1180 1343 1478 1638 1830 2044 2165 2349 2566 2897
Demand 2 30 33 36 37 40 59 85 126 175 223 271 322 370 426 509 569 651 744 843 945 1038 1138 1244 1444 1598 1870 2120 2333 2558 2842
Demand 3 113 120 129 132 133 163 202 247 288 341 383 454 518 607 684 735 834 935 1097 1154 1229 1384 1554 1742 1925 2173 2452 2674 2903 3134
Demand 4 62 64 63 68 73 97 129 173 201 238 283 329 365 426 511 607 700 803 905 1001 1089 1209 1381 1512 1668 1829 2054 2244 2457 2703
Demand 5 120 126 134 145 159 189 223 263 299 338 398 455 511 571 606 645 685 764 852 911 981 1079 1197 1315 1465 1619 1788 1967 2109 2413
Demand 6 72 75 80 85 91 113 140 175 206 251 310 380 429 480 539 619 694 789 886 960 1046 1190 1299 1437 1527 1644 1762 1977 2193 2486
Demand 7 13 14 14 14 14 31 49 71 93 116 153 176 214 248 308 349 406 464 542 628 688 775 843 905 959 1061 1181 1341 1507 1608
Demand 8 40 43 47 49 53 91 116 145 174 224 259 298 337 381 442 513 606 731 835 951 1058 1209 1340 1470 1705 1925 2161 2348 2486 2781
Demand 9 51 53 59 63 65 88 111 127 165 204 242 296 334 380 443 546 621 717 828 927 1033 1189 1338 1495 1665 1839 2061 2325 2622 2972
Demand 1 46 49 53 56 60 86 114 145 173 223 258 301 338 416 487 553 609 675 788 880 985 1086 1166 1375 1510 1673 1774 2008 2161 2415
Example of deman generation after the five year o eration (the case after Demand 1)
Year 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Demandl-1 185 222 262 294 345 396 462 502 560 627 685 768 855 941 1042 1153 1251 1396 1518 1671 1871 2072 2281 2493 2704
Demandl-2 181 217 254 308 354 390 427 476 544 625 680 769 839 942 1034 1133 1252 1416 1602 1729 1949 2141 2293 2593 2832
Demandl-3 193 224 261 313 347 401 452 525 571 624 696 762 820 898 1021 1160 1343 1425 1563 1693 1794 1920 2008 2190 2391
Demandl-4 189 233 278 306 351 385 448 517 577 664 744 823 894 1023 1070 1202 1319 1447 1572 1766 1846 2119 2318 2529 2828
Demand1-5 182 224 254 297 328 376 431 509 558 621 719 794 885 986 1070 1169 1239 1373 1475 1633 1760 1938 2123 2362 2482
Demandl-6 196 221 258 296 350 416 470 562 618 698 796 886 1012 1056 1160 1251 1399 1594 1786 2086 2216 2411 2618 2868 3138
Demandl-7 188 219 254 294 322 355 411 472 544 652 751 819 937 1021 1157 1258 1353 1467 1554 1685 1825 2061 2176 2327 2557
Demandl-8 191 231 268 317 365 423 477 527 598 630 725 797 876 944 1091 1201 1329 1457 1599 1734 1860 2033 2263 2496 2708
Demand1-9 182 203 248 287 332 399 457 494 557 586 613 695 763 845 947 1059 1163 1217 1377 1513 1680 1816 1948 2225 2517
Demandl-10 181 217 257 284 325 372 418 468 517 570 615 660 747 803 854 932 1079 1220 1366 1524 1656 1730 1893 2150 2365
00
M
Table A4-2: Monte-Carlo Simulation for Choice 1 (NPV Unit: 1,000 Yen)
(-14m berth for Phasel with expansion options: 1.-14m berth, 2. -14m & -10m berths at year 10)
Outcome Summary
Base Expected Option Value Total
NPV 9,619,980 3,578,816 13,198,796
High cost 8,050,911 - -
Medium cost 9,702,563 -
Low cost 11,106,467 - -
I X :7 Decision taken for Phase 2
After Demand 1
Expansioni Expansion2 No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 18,443,442 17,742,222 13,538,543 4,904,899
High cost 15,891,999 14,738,084 11,969,473 3,922,526
Medium cost 18,577,728 17,900,334 13,621,125 4,956,603
Low cost 20,860,597 20,588,246 15,025,030 5,835,568
After Demand 2
Expansion1 Expansion2 No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 10,672,496 9,490,310 7,764,703 2,907,793
High cost 8,121,053 6,486,173 6,195,633 1,925,420
Medium cost 10,806,782 9,648,423 7,847,285 2,959,497
Low cost 13,089,651 12,336,335 9,251,190 3,838,461
After Demand 3
Expansion1 Expansion2 No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 20,027,475 20,607,662 13,254,872 7,352,790
High cost 17,476,033 17,603,525 11,685,802 5,917,723
Medium cost 20,161,761 20,765,775 13,337,454 7,428,320
Low cost 22,444,630 23,453,687 14,741,359 8,712,328
After Demand 4
Expansion1 Expansion2 No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 9,964,929 8,272,956 7,959,307 2,005,621
High cost 7,413,486 5,268,819 6,390,238 1,023,249
Medium cost 10,099,215 8,431,069 8,041,890 2,057,325
Low cost 12,382,084 11,118,981 9,445,794 2,936,290
After Demand 5
Expansion1 Expansion2 No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 20,617,382 20,820,337 14,115,080 6,788,504
High cost 18,065,940 17,816,200 12,546,010 5,519,930
Medium cost 20,751,669 20,978,449 14,197,662 6,780,787
Low cost 23,034,538 23,666,361 15,601,567 8,064,795
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*
*
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*
After Demand 6
Expansion1 Expansion2 No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 12,994,492 11,626,736 9,730,274 3,264,219
High cost 10,443,050 8,622,599 8,161,204 2,281,846
Medium cost 13,128,779 11,784,849 9,812,856 3,315,923
Low cost 15,411,648 14,472,761 11,216,761 4,194,888
After Demand 7
Expansion1 Expansion2 No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 2,745,914 416,837 3,629,259 15,774
High cost 194,472 -2,587,300 2,060,190 0
Medium cost 2,880,200 574,949 3,711,842 0
Low cost 5,163,070 3,262,861 5,115,746 47,323
After Demand 8
Expansion1 Expansion2 No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 12,393,383 11,263,063 8,804,160 3,589,223
High cost 9,841,941 8,258,926 7,235,090 2,606,851
Medium cost 12,527,669 11,421,176 8,886,742 3,640,927
Low cost 14,810,539 14,109,088 10,290,647 4,519,892
After Demand 9
Expansion1 Expansion2 No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 9,280,800 7,427,103 7,482,572 1,798,227
High cost 6,729,358 4,422,966 5,913,503 815,855
Medium cost 9,415,086 7,585,216 7,565,155 1,849,931
Low cost 11,697,955 10,273,128 8,969,059 2,728,896
After Demand 10
Expansion1 Expansion2 No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 11,976,239 10,720,198 8,815,129 3,161,109
High cost 9,424,797 7,716,060 7,246,060 2,178,737
Medium cost 12,110,525 10,878,310 8,897,712 3,212,813
Low cost 14,393,395 13,566,222 10,301,616 4,091,778
* Option Value = Max(Expansion1, Expansion2, No Expansion) - No Expansion
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Table A4-3: Monte-Carlo Simulation for Choice 2 (NPV Unit: 1,000 Yen)
(-14m & -10m berths for Phase 1 with an expansion option (-14m berth) at Year 10)
Outcome Summary
Base Expected Option Value Total
NPV 12,017,033 209,911 12,226,944
High cost 9,688,571 - -
Medium cost 12,139,584 -
Low cost 14,222,945 - -
Decision to be taken for Phase 2
After Demand 1
Expansion No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 16,111,882 16,978,952 21,199
High cost 12,801,047 14,650,490 0
Medium cost 16,286,136 17,101,503 0
Low cost 19,248,462 19,184,864 63,598
After Demand 2
Expansion No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 7,859,970 9,759,363 0
High cost 4,549,136 7,430,901 0
Medium cost 8,034,225 9,881,914 0
Low cost 10,996,551 11,965,275 0
After Demand 3
Expansion No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 18,977,322 17,687,467 1,289,855
High cost 15,666,487 15,359,005 307,482
Medium cost 19,151,577 17,810,018 1,341,559
Low cost 22,113,902 19,893,379 2,220,524
After Demand 4
Expansion No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 6,642,616 9,430,803 0
High cost 3,331,782 7,102,341 0
Medium cost 6,816,871 9,553,354 0
Low cost 9,779,196 11,636,714 0
After Demand 5
Expansion No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 19,189,997 18,499,102 788,054
High cost 15,879,162 16,170,640 0
Medium cost 19,364,251 18,621,653 742,598
Low cost 22,326,577 20,705,014 1,621,563
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After Demand 6
Expansion No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 9,996,397 12,071,596 0 *
High cost 6,685,562 9,743,134 0 *
Medium cost 10,170,651 12,194,147 0 *
Low cost 13,132,977 14,277,508 0
After Demand 7
Expansion No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value -1,213,503 3,153,403 0
High cost -4,524,338 824,941 0 *
Medium cost -1,039,249 3,275,954 0 *
Low cost 1,923,077 5,359,314 0 *
After Demand 8
Expansion No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 9,632,723 11,262,155 0
High cost 6,321,889 8,933,693 0 *
Medium cost 9,806,978 11,384,705 0 *
Low cost 12,769,303 13,468,066 0 *
After Demand 9
Expansion No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 5,796,764 8,797,724 0
High cost 2,485,929 6,469,262 0 *
Medium cost 5,971,018 8,920,275 0 *
Low cost 8,933,344 11,003,636 0 *
After Demand 10
Expansion No Expansion Option Value
Expected Value 9,089,858 11,082,280 0
High cost 5,779,023 8,753,818 0 *
Medium cost 9,264,112 11,204,830 0 *
Low cost 12,226,438 13,288,191 0 *
* Option Value = Max(Expansion, No Expansion) - No Expansion
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Appendix 5: Black-Scholes equation for Case Study
The Black Scholes valuation for the case study is basically the same as that in
Chapter 3. Applying the Black-Scholes equation, V = N(dl)*A - N(d2)*X*exp(-rf*T),
to the case study:
V = Current value of call option
A = Expected value of additional net benefit flow by expansion (Current value of
underlying asset)
X = Cost of expansion
rf = 4% (assumption)
T = 10 years (five years for construction of Phase 1 facilities and five years of
operation)
N(dl) and N(d2) are the values of the normal distribution at dl and d2
dl = [ln(A/X) + (r +0.5*cy2)*T ]/( a*T 5 )
d2 = dl - Y*T0.5
a = Volatility of the underlying asset
Here, because there are no a priori data on the underlying asset and its volatility
for this particular case, the realizations of the Monte-Carlo simulation calculated before
are used in valuing them. The expected value calculated from the initially generated ten
demand growth paths can be seen as the current value of the underlying asset.
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The expected value calculated from ten further realizations of demand paths for
the period after Year 11 for each realization of the initially generated ten demand growth
paths can be seen as each value that the underlying asset can have in ten years.
Here, in order to deal with the uncertainty in exercise price (construction cost),
high construction cost is used for X, the exercise price, and the difference between high
construction cost and medium/low construction cost is added to the net benefit. Thus, 30
(10 demand growth paths*3 costs) underlying asset values in ten years are obtained.
Then the ratio of each value to the current value is calculated. Standard deviation of the
natural log of the ratio is assumed as ten year volatility. Annual volatility is then
obtained by dividing it by ten.
It should be noted that the option value of Choice I is not the option value of
adding a -14m berth and a -10m berth to existing -14m berth, but the sum of the option
value of adding a -14m berth to the existing -14m berth (4,116 million Yen) and the
option value of adding a -10m berth to two -14m berths (262 million Yen), as Chapter 3
explains.
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Table A5-1: Volatility of Asset Value with Choice 1
(Additional net benefit by adding a -14m berth to one -14m berth)
(unit: 1,000 Yen)
Current Value 10,810,623
* Expected value is calculated using initialy generated Demand 1 ~ Demand 10.
Demand case Cost case Value Ratio (to Current) Ln(Ratio)
High 10,205,393 0.94402 -0.05761
1-1 1-10 Medium 11,857,045 1.09680 0.09239
Low 13,260,949 1.22666 0.20429
High 8,521,723 0.78827 -0.23791
2-1 2-10 Medium 10,173,375 0.94105 -0.06076
Low 11,577,280 1.07092 0.06852
High 12,643,654 1.16956 0.15663
3-1 ~3-10 Medium 14,295,307 1.32234 0.27940
Low 15,699,211 1.45220 0.37308
High 7,438,204 0.68805 -0.37390
4-1 -4-10 Medium 9,089,856 0.84083 -0.17337
Low 10,493,761 0.97069 -0.02975
High 12,015,741 1.11148 0.10569
5-1 - 5-10 Medium 13,667,393 1.26426 0.23448
Low 15,071,298 1.39412 0.33226
High 8,556,282 0.79147 -0.23386
6-1 ~6-10 Medium 10,207,934 0.94425 -0.05736
Low 11,611,838 1.07411 0.07150
High 4,338,740 0.40134 -0.91295
7-1 - 7-10 Medium 5,990,393 0.55412 -0.59037
Low 7,394,297 0.68398 -0.37982
High 8,830,890 0.81687 -0.20227
8-1 - 8-10 Medium 10,482,542 0.96965 -0.03082
Low 11,886,447 1.09952 0.09487
High 7,032,280 0.65050 -0.43002
9-1 9-10 Medium 8,683,932 0.80328 -0.21905
Low 10,087,837 0.93314 -0.06920
High 8,449,050 0.78155 -0.24648
10-1 - 10-10 Medium 10,100,702 0.93433 -0.06792
Low 11,504,606 1.06419 0.06222
Volatility (10 yrs.) 28.9%
Annual Volatility j 2.9%
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Table A5-2: Option value with Choice 1
(Expansion option of adding a -14m berth to one -14m berth)
Black-Scholes Model Calculates value of European call. (Currency Unit: 1,OOOYen)
A 10,810,623
X 9,909,913
l+rf 1.04
t 10 yrs
Sigma 2.9%
dl N(dl) d2 N(d2)
5.285 1.000 5.194 1.000
Call Value 4,115,841
m
Table A5-3: Volatility of Asset Value with Choice 1
(Additional net benefit by adding a -10m berth to two -14m berths)
(unit: 1,000 Yen)
Current Value 2,270,849
* Expected value is calculated using initialy generated Demand 1 ~ Demand 10.
Demand case Cost case Value Ratio (to Current) Ln(Ratio)
High 1,705,210 0.75091 -0.28647
1-1 1-10 Medium 2,354,457 1.03682 0.03616
Low 2,906,316 1.27984 0.24673
High 1,224,245 0.53911 -0.61783
2-1 2-10 Medium 1,873,492 0.82502 -0.19235
Low 2,425,351 1.06804 0.06582
High 2,986,618 1.31520 0.27399
3-1 -3-10 Medium 3,635,864 1.60110 0.47069
Low 4,187,723 1.84412 0.61200
High 714,458 0.31462 -1.15638
4-1 4-10 Medium 1,363,704 0.60053 -0.50995
Low 1,915,564 0.84355 -0.17014
High 2,609,385 1.14908 0.13896
5-1-5-10 Medium 3,258,631 1.43498 0.36115
Low 3,810,490 1.67800 0.51760
High 1,038,675 0.45739 -0.78221
6-1 - 6-10 Medium 1,687,921 0.74330 -0.29666
Low 2,239,780 0.98632 -0.01378
High 77,353 0.03406 -3.37953
7-1-7-10 Medium 726,600 0.31997 -1.13953
Low 1,278,459 0.56299 -0.57450
High 1,276,111 0.56195 -0.57634
8-1 - 8-10 Medium 1,925,357 0.84786 -0.16504
Low 2,477,216 1.09088 0.08698
High 552,734 0.24340 -1.41303
9-1 - 9-10 Medium 1,201,980 0.52931 -0.63618
Low 1,753,840 0.77233 -0.25835
High 1,150,389 0.50659 -0.68005
10-1 - 10-10 Medium 1,799,635 0.79249 -0.23257
Low 2,351,495 1.03551 0.03490
Volatility (10 yrs 76.3%
Annual Volatility1 7.9%
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Table A5-4: Option value with Choice 1
(Expansion option of adding a -10m berth to two -14m berths)
Black-Scholes Model Calculates value of European call. (Currency Unit: 1,OOOYen)
A 2,270,849
X 3,246,231
1+rf 1.04
t 10 yrs
Sigma 7.9%
dl N(dl) d2 N(d2)
0.265 0.604 0.016 0.506
Call Value 262,140
00
Table A5-5: Volatility of Asset Value with Choice 2
(Additional net benefit by adding a -14m berth to -10m & -14m berths)
(unit: 1,000 Yen)
Current Value 5,567,548
* Expected value is calculated using initialy generated Demand 1 - Demand 10.
Demand case Cost case Value (1,000 Yen) Ratio (to Current) Ln(Ratio)
High 4,355,015 0.78221 -0.24563
1-1 - 1-10 Medium 6,006,668 1.07887 0.07592
Low 7,410,572 1.33103 0.28595
High 3,322,693 0.59680 -0.51618
2-1 ~2-10 Medium 4,974,345 0.89345 -0.11266
Low 6,378,250 1.14561 0.13594
High 6,511,941 1.16962 0.15668
3-1 - 3-10 Medium 8,163,593 1.46628 0.38273
Low 9,567,497 1.71844 0.54142
High 2,433,899 0.43716 -0.82746
4-1 -4-10 Medium 4,085,551 0.73382 -0.30950
Low 5,489,456 0.98597 -0.01413
High 5,912,980 1.06204 0.06020
5-1 ~5-10 Medium 7,564,632 1.35870 0.30653
Low 8,968,537 1.61086 0.47677
High 3,146,886 0.56522 -0.57054
6-1 - 6-10 Medium 4,798,538 0.86188 -0.14864
Low 6,202,443 1.11403 0.10799
High 855,180 0.15360 -1.87340
7-1 ~7-10 Medium 2,506,832 0.45026 -0.79794
Low 3,910,736 0.70242 -0.35323
High 3,592,654 0.64528 -0.43806
8-1 ~8-10 Medium 5,244,307 0.94194 -0.05981
Low 6,648,211 1.19410 0.17739
High 2,221,125 0.39894 -0.91894
9-1 9-10 Medium 3,872,778 0.69560 -0.36298
Low 5,276,682 0.94776 -0.05366
High 4,355,015 0.78221 -0.24563
10-1 - 10-10 Medium 6,006,668 1.07887 0.07592
Low 7,410,572 1.33103 0.28595
Volatility (10yrs) 50.8%
Annual Volatility 5.1%
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Table A5-6: Option value with Choice 2
(Expansion option of adding a -14m berth to -14m & -10m berths)
Black-Scholes Model Calculates value of European call. (Currency Unit: 1,OOOYen)
A 5,567,548
X 9,909,913
1 +rf 1.04
t 10 yrs
Sigma 5.1%
dl N(d1) d2 N(d2)
-1.067 0.143 -1.228 0.110
Call Value 61,063
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